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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Historical context and state of affairs 
Malaŵi1 gained independence from Britain in 1964 and became a Republic in 1966.2 
As a Republic, it delinked its economy from Britain and set up its own financial 
system, with the Malaŵi Kwacha as the new currency. The Kwacha was however still 
fixed to the British Sterling Pound, up to 1973.3 However, to date, 47 years after 
political independence and 45 years after financial independence, Malaŵi remains 
one of the Least Developing Countries4 and poverty remains a key 
challenge.5  Progress has however, been made in tackling poverty and other social 
challenges.6  
 
Malaŵi‘s developing financial sector remains small and dominated by banking.7 
Capital markets are not fully developed and activity on the Malaŵi Stock Exchange 
(MSE)8 remains very limited.9 The central bank, Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) is 
the regulator10 of the financial services sector and its governor is the statutory 
registrar of the financial service sector.11 In an attempt to enhance the financial 
sector‘s supervisory framework, Malaŵi has recently introduced amendments to the 
existing law, enacted new laws and drafted new bills to cover the financial services 
sector in Malaŵi.12 However all the amendments, new acts and proposed bills whilst 
                                                 
1
  Literary ―flames of fire‖- although the country‘s name is commonly written as ―Malawi‖, the proper 
name is ―Malaŵi‖. In this work the proper way of writing the name is adopted notwithstanding its 
otherwise usage, the exception being for material quoted from other sources and names of journals. 
2
  ‗Malawi‘ Department of Tourism available at 
http://www.visitmalawi.mw/About%20Malawi/aboutmalawi.htm (accessed 1 January 2011). 
3  Ndaferankhande MD & Ndhlovu TM ‗Inflationary experiences in Malawi: An investigation of the 
underlying determinants‘ (2006) 14 available at www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2006-
EOI.../Ndaferankhande.pdf (accessed 1 January 2011). 
4
  Malaŵi is also a Land-Locked Least Developing Country (LLDC) ‗UN-OHRLLS: Least Developed 
Countries‘ available at  http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/ (accessed 22 August 2010). 
5
  ‗African Economic Outlook : Malawi‘ available at 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/southern-africa/malawi/ (accessed 17 
September 2010). (hereafter African Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010)). 
6
  African Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010). 
7
   ‗2010 Index of Economic Freedom‘ The Wall Street Journal, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/malawi (accessed 17 September 2010) (hereafter Index of 
Economic Freedom (2010)). 
8
  The only stock exchange. 
9
  Index of Economic Freedom (2010). 
10
  Section 3 The Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) Act Chapter 44:02 of Laws of Malaŵi. 
11
  Section 8(2) Financial Services Act 2010. 
12
  Index of Economic Freedom (2010). 
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providing for a comprehensive regulatory framework still concentrates all regulatory 
and supervisory authority within the RBM.13  
 
1.2 Background 
Over the years financial regulation and supervision in many countries have been 
organized around specialist agencies with distinct responsibilities for banking, 
securities and insurance sectors, however, there has in recent years, been a trend 
towards restructuring financial supervision and in particular towards unified regulatory 
agencies.14 Countries have gradually moved towards some form of unified regulation 
based on a twin peaks or multiple peaks model or even on a single peak model.15 
The most notable single peak case is the Financial Services Authority16 (FSA) of the 
UK.17 A regulator may be partially unified or fully unified.18 The term single regulator 
commonly refers to a fully unified regulator.19 
 
In Malaŵi the RBM is the single regulator. It regulates and supervises all financial 
sectors including banks, pension services, insurance companies, discount houses 
and the MSE. The RBM employs the silo matrix20 of financial services regulation and 
supervision.  
 
Institutional aspects of financial regulation and supervision are receiving great 
attention around the world.21 Protecting investors to help build confidence in the 
market, ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, reducing systemic 
risk (contagion), protection against malpractices such as money laundering, insider 
                                                 
13
  The Reserve Bank is the regulator in all the new law and proposed laws - see Mhango P ‗Design 
Issues for Pension Legislation in Malawi: Presentation to the IOPS Workshop‘ (2008) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/14/40104478.pdf  (accessed 17 September 2010). 
14
  Mwenda KK ‗Legal Aspects of Unified Financial Services Supervision in Germany‘ (2003) German 
Law Journal, Vol 04 No 10 (hereafter Mwenda KK (2003)) 1009 but see Mwenda KK Legal Aspects 
of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator (2006) (hereafter Mwenda 
KK (2006)) 3 where he says a longer track record of experience with unified regulators is still 
needed before coming up with firm conclusions. 
15
  See generally Wymeersch E ‗The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe About Single, Twin 
Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors‘ (2007) European Business Organization Law Review 8: 
237-306, (hereafter Wymeersch E (2007)). 
16
  Hereafter in the text referred to as FSA. 
17
  See generally Briault C ‗The Rationale for a Single National Regulator‖ (1999) FSA Occasional 
Paper. 
18
  Mwenda KK (2006) 37 but see generally Chapter 3 of the book. 
19
  Mwenda KK (2006) 10. 
20
  See Mwenda KK (2006) 6. 
21
  Demaestri E & Sorrouille D ‗Integrated Financial Supervision : Experiences in Selected Countries‘ 
(2003) Inter-American Development Bank (hereafter Demaestri E & Sorrouille D (2003)) at foreword. 
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trading etc. and maintaining consumer confidence in the financial system comprise 
the broad objectives of regulation.22 A key objective of regulations is to redress 
information imbalances that sometimes exist between financial services businesses 
in favour of the consumer.23 Control of market abuses boosts consumer confidence.24 
However, before designing any framework, the size and structure of the industry and 
the role of the regulator need to be understood.25 It is also important to take into 
consideration the economic, political, legal26 and historic considerations when 
designing a regulatory framework.27  
 
Malaŵi is a Constitutional supremacy28 with three arms of government viz; executive, 
legislature and judiciary.29 The RBM is a creature of statute30 and a constitutional 
body.31  Section 3 of the RBM Act 1989 states that among the principal objectives of 
the RBM shall be to supervise banks and other financial institutions. 
 
The RBM has the statutory authority to supervise banks and other financial 
institutions. The RBM Act defines financial institution ‗as any person, other than a 
bank, registered as a financial institution under the Banking Act‘ and other 
financial institutions ‗includes financial institutions and pensions, assurance and 
insurance institutions‘.32 The Financial Services Act 201033 broadens the 
definition of a financial institution to include a bank, and institutions defined as 
such in the Securities Act 2010,34  Insurance Act 2009,35 Microfinance Act 2010,36 
Financial Cooperatives Act [sic],37 Pension Act [sic],38  Credit Reference Bureau 
                                                 
22
  Mwenda KK (2006) 3. 
23
  Mwenda KK (2006) 4. 
24
  Mwenda KK (2006) 4. 
25
  Mwenda KK (2006) 6. 
26
   i.e. Constitution and whether the country is a Common law or Civil law or both (as in the case of 
Cameroun). 
27
  Mwenda KK (2006) 48. 
28
  Sections 4,5, 199 The Constitution of the Republic of Malaŵi 1994 (hereafter The Constitution). 
29
  Sections 7, 8 9 The Constitution of the Republic of Malaŵi 1994. 
30
  The Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) Act 1989 (hereafter RBM Act or RBMA) 
31
  Section 185(1) of the Republic of Malaŵi Constitution states ‗There shall be established by an Act 
of Parliament a central bank of the Republic, known as the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi which shall 
serve as the State's principal instrument for the control of money supply, currency and the 
institutions of finance and shall serve generally in accordance with the normal functions of a central 
bank‘. 
32
  Section 2 RBM Act. 
33
  Hereafter referred in the text as Financial Services Act or FSAM. 
34
  Hereafter referred in the text as Securities Act or SA2010. 
35
  Hereafter referred in the text as Insurance Act or IA2009. 
36
  Hereafter referred in the text as Microfinance Act or MFA2010. 
37
  Although it is stated as an ―Act‖ in the Financial Services Act, the Financial Cooperatives Bill is yet 
to be enacted according to law. 
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Act 201039 and the Building Society Act 196440  This definition basically includes 
any institution41 dealing in financial or financial-like services in Malaŵi.  
 
The RBM exercises its regulatory and supervisory authority under the following 
legislation: 
(a) The Reserve Bank of Malaŵi Act42 
(b) The Banking Act 200943 
(c) The Securities Act44 
(d) The Exchange Control Act45 
(e) Microfinance Act46 
(f) Insurance Act47 
(g) Credit Reference Bureau Act48 
(h) Building Society Act49 
(i) Financial Services Act50 
 
The following Bills have been laid before Parliament and passed51 and are likely to 
become part of the financial services law in the near future: 
(a) Pension Bill52 
                                                                                                                                                        
38
  Although it is stated as an ―Act‖ in the Financial Services Act, the Pensions Bill is yet to be enacted 
according to law. 
39
  Hereafter referred in the text as Building Society Act or BSA. 
40
  Section 2 Financial Services Act. 
41
  Both juristic and natural persons. 
42
  a text of the Act available at http://www.rbm.mw/documents/legislation/rbmact.pdf (accessed 1 
February 2011). 
43
  Hereafter referred as the Banking Act or BA2009. It replaced the Banking Act, 1989 (hereafter the 
repealed Banking Act. However although s 1 states that the Act shall be cited as the Banking Act, 
2009, it is Act No 10 of 2010. The Financial Services Act in s 2 refers to it as the Banking Act 
2010[sic]. Text available at  
http://www.rbm.mw/documents/legislation/Banking%20Act%202010.pdf (accessed 1 February 
2011). 
44
  Which has just replaced the Capital Market Development Act, chap 46 :06 of the Laws of Malaŵi. 
The repealed Act can is still available at 
http://www.rbm.mw/general_info/docs/CAPITAL%20MARKET%20DEVELOPMENT%20ACT.pdf  
(accessed 1 February 2011). 
45
  Chapter 45 :01 of the Laws of Malaŵi available at 
http://www.rbm.mw/documents/legislation/EXCHANGE%20CONTROL%20ACT.pdf (accessed 1 
February 2011) – a new Bill has been laid before Parliament to replace this Act. 
46
  A new law. 
47
  Which has just replaced the Insurance Act; chap 47:01. However although s 1 states that the Act 
shall be cited as the Insurance Act, 2009, it is Act No 9 of 2010. The Financial Services Act in s 2 
refers to it as the Insurance Act 2010. 
48
  A new law. 
49
  Chapter 32:01 of the Laws of Malaŵi. 
50
  A new law, being the umbrella Act of all financial service laws, text available at 
http://www.rbm.mw/documents/basu/FINANCIAL%20SERVICES%202010.pdf  (accessed 1 
February 2011). 
51
  Awaiting Presidential Assent and publication in the Gazette – see s 49 Constitution. 
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(b) Financial Cooperatives Bill53 
(c) Reserve Bank Amendment Bill54 
 
The Financial Services Act defines all the above Acts and Bills except the Exchange 
Control Act55 (and the Amendment Bill) as forming the ―financial services law‖.56 
 
The governor and deputy governor of the RBM are appointed exclusively by the 
President of Malaŵi.57 The board of directors of the RBM is also appointed 
exclusively by the President and comprises the governor, deputy governor, and five 
other directors who may include58 secretary to the treasury, secretary for economic 
planning and development and accountant general.59  The governor (or deputy 
governor in the governor‘s absence) chairs the board of directors.60  The RBM is thus 
de facto and de jure under the executive.  
 
Malaŵi has been a one-party state for most of its existence.61 Through a referendum 
in 1993, Malaŵians voted for a multiparty system and in 1994 Malaŵi had multiparty 
elections with a new Constitution62 in place and presidential term that runs for five 
years with a maximum of two terms.63 Malaŵi has had three Presidents since it 
became independent; Dr. Kamuzu Banda,64 Dr. Bakili Muluzi65 and Professor Bingu 
wa Mutharika.66 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
52
  A new law to regulate the Pension Industry. The law will make pension (contributions) compulsory. 
53
   To replace the Savings and Credit Cooperatives Act. 
54
  Awaiting Presidential assent which is by law required in Malaŵi before a Bill which has been laid 
down, debated and passed by Parliament can become law – s  73 The Constitution. 
55
  This Act controls operation of Forex Bureaux which were established after subsidiary legislation - 
Exchange Control (Forex Bureaux and Foreign Exchange Fixing Sessions) Regulation of 1994 
56
  Hereafter abbreviated to FSL for both the singular and plural forms  s 2 Financial Services Act. The 
author is of the view that the omission of the Exchange Control Act is by error and not design. 
57
  Section 12 RBM Act; s 6 of the RBM Amendment Bills proposed the appointment of not more than 
three deputy governors (up from the present one) and not more than seven directors – Sonani B 
‗Cut President‘s powers over RBM – MPS‘ The Nation 10 December 2010 available at 
http://www.nationmw.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10828:cut-presidents-
powers-over-rbmmps&catid=11:business-news&Itemid=4 (accessed 13 December 2010).  
58
  And usually does! 
59
  Section 6 RBM Act. 
60
  Section 11 RBM Act. 
61
  From 1966 when it became a Republic to 1994. There were minority parties when Malaŵi became 
Independent in 1964 following the general elections of 1961 but this changed after 1966 and 
following the (in)famous ―cabinet crisis‖ when Dr. Banda reinforced his reigns on power. 
62
  Although the Constitution is designated as a 1994 legislation, the 1994 Constitution was interim 
and was only made sacrosanct in 1995, the notable removal from it being the senate. 
63
  Section 83 The Constitution. 
64
  1964-1994. 
65
  1994-2004. 
66
  2004-present (constitutionally up to 2014). 
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The RBM has had eleven governors since its inception in 1965.67 The average term 
of a governor since independence is approximately 4.7 years, almost equal to the 5-
year post-one-party political cycle.68 The longest serving governor of the RBM was 
Mr. John Tembo69 who served during the period of one-party rule.70 The shortest 
serving is A.G. Perrin who was the first governor and only served a year.71 An 
examination of the rate of turnover of governors after the advent of multiparty 
democracy72 indicates a drop to 4.5 years on average.73 The most interesting pattern 
is that there is a change in the governor within a year after every general election in 
the multiparty era.74 For example, Dr. Mathews Chikaonda replaced Mr. Francis 
Perekamoyo as governor in 1995 soon after the 1994 elections.75  Dr. Chikaonda 
was replaced by Dr. Elias Ngalande in 2000 after the 1999 elections whilst Dr. 
Ngalande himself was replaced by Mr. Victor Mbewe in 2005 after the 2004 
elections.76 Mr. Mbewe was replaced by the current governor, Dr. Perks Ligoya, 
months after the May 2009 general elections.77  
 
The influence of the executive arm (especially the presidency) on the RBM through 
the appointment of its governor and board is therefore self-evident, especially in the 
post-one-party era where each presidential term seems to coincide with a new 
governor of the RBM. It can therefore be inferred that, currently the job of governor of 
the RBM does not provide much security of tenure. It would seem that the RBM may 
therefore not pass an objective test of independence and this also provides an even 
greater reason for the development of a new order of financial service regulation in 
Malaŵi.  
 
                                                 
67
  See Kalilombe L Central Bank Governance, Accountability and Independence: The Case of 
Reserve Bank of Malawi (unpublished MA thesis, University of Kwazulu-Natal, 2008) (hereafter 
Kalilombe (2008)) 40 but add Dr. Perks Ligoya, the current Governor appointed in 2009. 
68
  Kalilombe (2008) 40. 
69
  (1971-1984) Famous Politician and now Leader of Opposition (one of the oldest serving Members 
of Parliament). John Tembo is now President of the Malaŵi Congress Party, the party that Dr. 
Kamuzu Banda led. But Kalilombe (2008) 20 cautions that ‗care should be taken in interpreting 
these values because low turnover sometimes may mean lower independence of the Central Bank. 
A subservient governor may stay in the seat for a longer time if he does what the politicians want 
him to do‘.. It is submitted this may have been the case in the John Tembo governorship. 
70
  Kalilombe (2008) 40. 
71
  Kalilombe (2008) 40. 
72
  Referendum was in 1993 and General Elections were held in 1994. 
73
  Kalilombe (2008) 40. 
74
  Kalilombe (2008) 41. 
75
  Kalilombe (2008) 41. 
76
  Kalilombe (2008) 41. 
77
  In September 2009 – Gondwe G ‗Reserve Bank of Malawi appoints new governor‘ available at 
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/415/87/40038.html (accessed 9 October 2010). 
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Malaŵi is however not unique in having a central bank as egulator and supervisor of 
the financial sector. The Netherlands, Antilles, Singapore and Uruguay are some of 
the countries with the peculiar regulatory system where the central bank and not a 
separate agency regulate securities firms, insurance companies as well as banks.78  
 
The financial sector of Malaŵi is still at a rudimentary stage with low public 
confidence as reflected in the illiquidity of the MSE.79 The MSE has been in existence 
since 1994 but started equity trading in November 1996 when it had its first listing.80 
Prior to that, the major activities undertaken were the provision of a facility for 
secondary market trading in Government of Malaŵi bonds namely, Treasury Bills and 
Local Registered Stocks.81 The Securities Act provides for the main regulatory 
framework for securities in Malaŵi. The MSE operates under the Securities Act. 
Malaŵi is also part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)82 and 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).83 Most of the members 
of SADC84 and COMESA85 have illiquid stock markets too.86 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
In examining the legal aspects of unified financial services supervision in Malaŵi, 
focus will be on the independence and accountability of the unified regulator. The 
study seeks to find out whether or not the central bank of Malaŵi, as a unified 
regulator, has adequate autonomy and efficacy under the legal framework for 
financial services supervision to carry out efficiently the unified supervision of 
financial services. Closely related to this, the study examines the issue of whether 
the unified regulator in Malaŵi does enjoy in practice adequate autonomy, as 
                                                 
78
  Mwenda KK (2006) 53. 
79
  For example the MSE registered no trading in the week 6-10 September, 2010 (11 September was 
a holiday) see – Chiyembekeza C ‗Stock market closes 4-day trading week flat‘ The Nation 13 
September 2010 available at 
http://www.nationmw.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5770:stock-market-
closes-4-day-trading-week-flat&catid=11:business-news&Itemid=4 (accessed 17 September 2010). 
80
  ‗Malawi Stock Exchange – Company Profile‘ available at http://www.mse.co.mw/prof.html 
(accessed 18 September 2010) (hereafter Malawi Stock Exchange – Company Profile (2010)). 
81
  Malawi Stock Exchange – Company Profile (2010). 
82
  Southern Africa Development Community available at http://www.sadc.int/ (accessed 17 
September 2010). 
83
  The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa available at http://www.comesa.int/ 
(accessed 17 September 2010). 
84
  Except the JSE in South Africa which is liquid by African standards. 
85
  Except for NSE in Kenya and EGX in Egypt. 
86
  See Marone H Small African Stock Markets—The Case of the Lusaka Stock Exchange (2003) 
(hereafter Marone H (2003)) 11 and see generally Mwenda KK ‗Securities Regulation And 
Emerging Markets: Legal And Institutional Issues For Southern And Eastern Africa‘ (2000) 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, Vol 7, No 1  (hereafter Mwenda KK (2000)). 
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provided for under the law, or whether it is constrained in its functions by 
interferences from other regulatory bodies or political institutions and persons.  
 
1.4 Objectives 
The overall objective of the proposed research is to propose a new regulatory and 
supervisory framework for the financial sector in Malaŵi.  
 
The specific objectives of the research are to: 
a) Critically analyse the structure of the current unified regulatory and supervisory 
system under the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (Malaŵi‘s central bank) by examining the 
legal, structural and institutional framework under which the current structure 
operates. 
b) Critically analyse the concept of ‗an independent financial service regulator‘ 
detached from the central bank as well as the notion of central bank independence. 
c) Examine the efficacy of the legislative, regulatory and institutional framework for 
unified financial services supervision with a view to making policy recommendations 
for possible law reform. 
  
1.5 Research hypothesis  
The research is premised on the assumption that the current financial service 
regulation and supervision in Malaŵi is not independent, efficient and effective.  The 
financial sector in Malaŵi has developed since 1964 when the RBM was 
established87 but the legislature has simply piled on the RBM with (more) regulatory 
and supervisory powers of all new entrants in the financial service sector. The 
assumption is that if financial service regulation were to be detached from the RBM 
and placed in an independent regulatory body, this would leave the RBM to monitor 
any crisis that may develop in the financial sector from ‗arms-length‘ without it being 
directly a priori involved and thereby losing its high ground. The RBM would then 
concentrate on its role of ‗lender of last resort‘. Further, freeing the RBM from the 
clutches of the executive would ensure separation (but not necessarily disconnect) 
between fiscal and monetary policy and ensure that the RBM concentrates on 
monetary policy.88 
                                                 
87
  But it started operating in 1965. 
88
  For example Malaŵi‘s pursuit of a de facto fixed (pegged) exchange rate policy from 2006 to late 
2009 made it difficult for the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) to clear the foreign exchange market 
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1.6 Scope 
It is admitted that the subject area under consideration is very extensive. Therefore, a 
limited but refined scope is proposed. The concept of central bank independence will 
mostly be dealt within the context of an effective framework that would be of 
beneficial interest to Malaŵi as a country. The thesis assumes that since Malaŵi 
already does have a unified regulator (the RBM), there will be no need to go into an 
elaborate discussion of different regulatory systems.  
 
1.7 Significance of the research 
As stated above, Malaŵi is a LLDC and with poverty being a key challenge although 
progress has been made resulting in increased household food security 
complimenting strong macroeconomic performance. The financial sector is still 
rudimentary and dominated by banking with capital markets which are not fully 
developed resulting in limited activity on the MSE. The Legislature has enacted new 
laws and amendments to the laws and some bills are pending enactment in a bid to 
improve financial sector regulation and supervision. However this notwithstanding, all 
regulatory and supervisory authority and power is still concentrated within the RBM.  
 
Malaŵi would therefore benefit from an effective and independent financial regulatory 
system to attract investors, boost consumer confidence and explore other avenues 
such as cross-border listings which have the potential of leading to economic 
development and thereby reducing poverty. Such a system would also ensure that 
economic growth is sustained. Furthermore an independent central bank would free 
the RBM from the effects of politics associated with elections. This research would 
therefore be of use to the Government, the RBM, other financial institutions as well 
as to the academia. Even if the proposed framework were not to be adopted 
wholesome, it is hoped this research would prove a valuable addition and increase 
the wealth of knowledge on effective and efficient financial sector regulation in 
Malaŵi as well as independence of the central bank. It is also hoped that this 
research can provide a strong ground and basis for further research in this field. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
at the official exchange rate, causing import demand backlogs and serious forex shortages. 
Foreign reserves became precariously low in 2009 falling to 0.6 months of imports – see African 
Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010). 
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1.8 Research methodology 
There is a wealth of literature available on central bank independence and financial 
service regulation. Fortunately, literature from Malaŵi, Africa and with an African 
perspective is now available.89 In this work, a comparative analysis of the financial 
regulatory models in the UK and Zambia is done. The motivation for choosing these 
jurisdictions is that Malaŵi‘s economy was once tied to the UK economy by virtue of 
colonialism and the influence of the UK‘s financial system on Malaŵi still persists, 
albeit in a diminished manner. Furthermore Malaŵi is a common law jurisdiction and 
some English statutes are still law in Malaŵi.90  As for Zambia, it too as a former 
British colony inherited the common law. The two countries also share common 
languages and ethnic groupings as well as a connected history91 They also have the 
same local name for their currency, the Kwacha. Economic and political conditions in 
Zambia are comparable to Malaŵi.92  
 
The research conducts a critical analysis of the situation within which the RBM 
operates as a financial service regulator as well as a central bank (both from the 
legal and practical point) and also critically engages with the literature in order to 
develop a robust framework for Malaŵi. 
 
This work is mainly based on research work carried out at the libraries of the 
University of the Western Cape and University of Malaŵi and relevant information 
available on the internet. Apart from this, visits were made and books, documents 
and pieces of legislation collected, sourced or procured from the MSE, RBM, Malaŵi 
Stock Brokers Limited and Government Printer (Malaŵi). This research further 
benefitted from course material made available as part of the course of the 
International Finance Law module of the LLM programme. 
 
 
                                                 
89
  Dr. Zolomphi Nkowani has written on the financial service in Malaŵi whilst Professor Kenneth 
Mwenda , amongst others, has written extensively on and about Africa and (developing) emerging 
markets and especially on Zambia : see the Bibliography. 
90
  The so-called received law. English judgements are constantly relied upon the Malaŵian Courts. 
91
   Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Malaŵi still has provisions that allow enforcement of 
judgements from Zambia (albeit referred to as Northern Rhodesia) although there is no reported 
case of any such provision being utilised. 
92
  Both are LDCs, both became multi-party states in the early. 
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1.9 Outline  
Chapter One introduces the thesis, discusses the background of the study and the 
problem that the thesis aims to address. It outlines the research objectives and 
provides an outline and overview of how the thesis is to be presented. 
 
Chapter Two conducts a literature review on independent financial regulation as well 
as central bank independence and emerging trends. A comparative study of 
countries in a similar position to Malaŵi (economically and politically) such as Zambia 
and how financial service regulation has evolved in that jurisdiction is also conducted. 
The UK‘s Financial Services Agency (FSA) serves as the model comparative 
regulator. 
 
Chapter Three critically discusses the existing regulatory framework of the financial 
sector in Malaŵi both from a legal, practical and political perspective and its 
developments since independence to the present. It analyses the various legal 
instruments and the political economy and their impact on financial service 
regulation. 
 
Chapter Four contains the proposed framework for a new financial service regulatory 
system in Malaŵi. The framework is developed from emerging trends from a global 
and comparative basis as applicable to Malaŵi and in view of the current situation of 
financial service regulation in Malaŵi. The framework developed in this Chapter 
draws a lot of its strength from Chapters Two and Three. 
 
Chapter Five contains the conclusions and recommendations arising out of the study 
including potential areas of future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
2.  A Sound and Independent Financial Regulatory Framework 
2.1 Overview and rationale for regulation 
Theory suggests that the primary role of financial institutions and capital markets is to 
facilitate the allocation of resources in an uncertain environment across space and 
time.93 Therefore regulation of the financial sector has a crucial role to play, 
especially in the development of third world countries, most of whom have enormous 
wealth disparities between sections of their populace. The term regulation refers to a 
set of binding rules issued by a private or public body.94 For the financial services 
sector, these can generally be defined as those rules that are applied by all 
regulators in the sector in the fulfilment of their functions.95 They include such 
prudential rules as those influencing the conditions of access to the market (intended 
to prevent the emergence of doubtful reputation entities with no implementation 
capacity for the intended operations) and those aimed at controlling the risk 
associated with financial activities, corporate governance and internal control 
systems, conduct-of business rules, and methods of supervision.96 Prudential 
regulations establish the outside limits and constraints placed on financial institutions 
to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system.97  
 
Because of the role that banks play in the financial system, prudential rules for banks 
are a cornerstone of the regulatory framework. A crucial aspect of prudential 
regulation regards the enforcement powers given to bank supervisors to intervene to 
prevent losses from magnifying and to effect timely resolutions of bank failures.98 
This entails a need to confer on bank supervisors the right to issue "cease and 
desist" orders, impose fines, appoint receivers, merge or liquidate banks, and 
generally play an active direct or indirect part in the management of ailing 
institutions.99 
 
                                                 
93
  Marone H (2003) 3. 
94
  Mwenda KK (2006) 5. 
95
  Mwenda KK (2006) 5. 
96
  Mwenda KK (2006) 5. 
97
  Polizatto VP ‗Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision‘ in Vittas D (ed) Financial Regulation 
(1992) (hereafter Polizatto VP (1992)) 177. 
98
  Vittas D in Vittas D (ed) Financial Regulation (1992) (hereafter Vittas D (1992)) 19. 
99
  Vittas D (1992) 19. 
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Although most often the regulator is also the supervisor, the role of the regulator and 
that of the supervisor are somewhat different. A regulator is concerned mainly with 
preparing and issuing regulations and promoting a culture of compliance with these 
regulations while a supervisor may undertake on-site and off-site supervision of 
financial services business.100 In most jurisdictions however, the powers to regulate 
and to supervise the activities of the financial services sector reside in the same 
institution.101 The regulatory framework of financial services often comprises primary 
regulation,102 secondary legislation103 and guidance and (policy) directives and 
directions issued by the regulator.104 
 
Over the years financial regulation and supervision in many countries have been 
organized around specialist agencies with distinct responsibilities for banking, 
securities and insurance sectors, however, there has been a trend towards 
restructuring financial supervision in recent years, and in particular towards unified 
regulatory agencies—that is, agencies that supervise two or more of these areas.105 
The institutional aspects of financial regulation and supervision are receiving great 
attention around the world.106 Even without a unified theory of financial service 
regulation, protecting investors (to help build confidence in the market), ensuring that 
markets are fair (efficient and transparent), reducing systemic risk (contagion), 
protection against malpractices (such as money laundering) and maintaining 
consumer confidence in the financial system comprise the broad objectives of 
regulation.107 A key objective of regulation is to redress information imbalances that 
sometimes exist between financial services businesses in favour of the consumer.108 
Control of market abuses boosts consumer confidence in the financial services 
sector.109  Broadly put therefore, Governments regulate the financial sector for two 
main reasons, the first being consumer protection (similar to the way they regulate 
public utilities and telecommunications to provide a framework of rules that can help 
                                                 
100
  Mwenda KK (2006) 5. 
101
  As in the UK, or Malaŵi (Part II of the Financial Services Act says the Registrar is to Regulate and 
Supervise Financial Institutions)  – see Mwenda KK (2006) 5. 
102
  Normally Acts of Parliament. 
103
  Normally Ministerial regulations issued pursuant to the Act of parliament (enabling statute) 
104
  Mwenda KK (2006) 5. 
105
  Mwenda  2003 at 1009-10, but see Mwenda KK (2006) 1  where he says a longer track record of 
experience with unified regulators is still needed before coming up with firm conclusions. 
106
  Demaestri E & Sorrouille D ‗Integrated Financial Supervision : Experiences in Selected Countries‘ 
(2003) Inter-American Development Bank (hereafter Demaestri E & Sorrouille D (2003)) at foreword. 
107
  Mwenda KK (2006) 3. 
108
  Mwenda KK (2006) 4. 
109
  Mwenda KK (2006) 4. 
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prevent excess and failures of a market left entirely to its own whims and devices) 
and the second is to maintain financial stability, a clear public good that justifies a 
more elaborate framework of regulation and supervision.110 
 
Regulators and supervisors in nations around the world are charged with managing 
the health of banks and other financial institutions and preserving the stability of the 
financial system.111 Financial service supervision, in particular, is more rigorous and 
intensive than supervision in other regulated sectors.112 Banking supervisors engage 
not only in off-site analysis of the bank‘s performance but also in intensive on-site 
inspections, and they intensify their monitoring and may intervene when banks fail to 
meet minimum requirements designed to ensure their financial soundness.113 
Supervisors can even, in extreme cases, take ownership rights away from the 
owners of failed or failing institutions.114 A clear example is what happened in Malaŵi 
recently. The regulator was called upon to supervise the operation of a troubled 
bank, Finance Bank of Malaŵi in 2005 leading to its closure.115 The regulator ended 
up running the bank116 and later liquidating its assets,117 a process yet to be 
concluded. It may be said, during all this time, part of the regulator‘s time has been 
taken away from the supervision of other banks to concentrate on this troubled bank. 
 
Banking regulation developed out of the concern of central banks to ensure financial 
stability.118 In many parts of the world, the central bank is responsible for regulating 
banks, while in others, it is a separate agency.119 In the non-banking financial sector, 
such as securities markets, insurance and pensions, regulation has usually been 
conducted either by a government ministry or by a specialist government agency.120 
 
                                                 
110
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW ‗Should Financial Sector Regulators be Independent?‘ (2004) IMF 
Economic Issues No 32 (hereafter Quintyn & Taylor (2004)) available at  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues32/#1 (accessed 14 March 2011) (note that article 
has no pages). 
111
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
112
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
113
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
114
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
115
  Phiri F ‗Finance Bank closure : Precursor to Return of Forfeiture Act?‘ available at 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MALAWIANA/message/3175 (accessed 17 September 2010). 
116
  Under statutory management as provided in the law (See s  68, Financial Services Act). 
117
  Voluntary liquidation, it must be said. 
118
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
119
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
120
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
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Before designing any framework, the size and structure of the industry and the role of 
the regulator need to be understood.121 It is also important to take into consideration 
the economic, political, legal122 and historic considerations when designing a 
regulatory framework.123 Recent research on the effectiveness of prudential 
regulation questions the unthinking transplantation of practices from rich countries 
into the very different political and institutional settings that prevail in most African 
countries.124 Detailed examination of cross-country evidence points to the limited 
effectiveness and, in many respects, the counter-productivity, in developing countries 
of some standard regulatory and supervisory practices.125 For example, the design of 
African stock markets, influenced by what was seen as best practice in advanced 
economies, may, through costs and prerequisites, have created barriers to listed 
equity finance for many African firms that could have obtained it if a more context-
sensitive regulatory design had been chosen.126 
 
The regulatory framework is often comprised of a combination of two or more of the 
following: (a) primary legislation (b) secondary legislation (c) principles, rules etc 
issued by the regulator and (d) guidance or policy directives issued by the 
regulator.127 The regulatory framework is country-specific.128 But whatever the 
situation, to be effective and efficient, a regulator must be able to lay down rules or 
principles of conduct of financial services business, authorise their operation, lay 
rules of operation, supervise compliance, enforce129 rules, investigate breaches and 
cooperate and exchange information with other regulators.130  
 
Whatever regulatory system is employed, the legal framework should clarify the roles 
and responsibilities of different agencies involved in financial supervision.131 The 
                                                 
121
  Mwenda KK (2006) 6. 
122
  i.e. Constitution and whether the country is a Common law or Civil law or both (as in the case of 
Cameroun). 
123
  Mwenda KK (2006) 6. 
124
  Honohan P & Beck T Making Finance Work for Africa (2007) (hereafter Honohan P & Beck T 
(2007)) at 85. 
125
  Honohan P & Beck T (2007) 85. 
126
 Honohan P & Beck T (2007) 10. 
127
  Mwenda KK (2006) 5 although in other jurisdictions legislation provides that guidelines are to be 
treated as law. 
128
  Mwenda KK (2006) 6 & 11. 
129
  Enforcement is a necessary product of the process of authorisation and supervision - Mwenda KK 
(2006) 16. 
130
  Mwenda KK (2006) 7. 
131
  Financial Sector Assessment (2005) The World Bank & The IMF (hereafter Financial Sector 
Assessment (2005))102.  
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central bank laws, banking laws, and other laws governing financial sector 
supervision need to specify the relationships among the supervisory agency, any 
deposit insurance agency and other financial sector supervisors.132 In addition, the 
relationship with the ministry of finance needs to be clear and to provide sufficient 
operational autonomy to the supervisor.133 If a country has put in place a unified 
financial supervisory agency, then this arrangement needs to be laid down in a law, 
and its autonomy and powers need to be explicit.134 The legal and regulatory basis of 
financial supervision should also support the core components of all financial 
supervisory standards.135 Those components consist of the following categories: 
• Regulatory governance; which refers to the objectives, independence, 
enforcement, and other attributes that provide the capacity to formulate and to 
implement sound regulatory policies and practices. 
• Regulatory practices; which refer to the practical application of laws, rules, and 
procedures. 
• Prudential framework; which refers to internal controls and governance 
arrangements to ensure prudent management and operations by financial firms. 
• Financial integrity and safety net arrangements; which refer to (a) the regulatory 
policies and instruments designed to promote fairness and integrity in the 
operations of financial institutions and markets and (b) the creation of safeguards 
for depositors, investors, and policyholders, particularly during times of financial 
distress and crisis.136 
 
2.2 Models of financial services regulation and supervision 
The four common models of financial services regulation are; regulation by 
objectives, functional regulation, institutional or regulation by silos and a single (also 
called a unified) regulator.137 The concept of single regulator is antithesis to 
institutional regulation but it is possible to have functional and institutional regulation 
in a joint matrix under a unified regulator.138 
 
                                                 
132
 Financial Sector Assessment (2005) 102. 
133
 Financial Sector Assessment (2005) 102. 
134
 Financial Sector Assessment (2005) 102. 
135
 Financial Sector Assessment (2005) 102. 
136
  Financial Sector Assessment (2005) 102. 
137
  Mwenda KK (2006) 8. 
138
  Mwenda KK (2006) 10. 
 
 
 
 
17 
Where the aim is to have regulation by objectives, the model seeks to achieve certain 
explicit objectives by giving responsibility for one or more of them to specific 
regulatory bodies that exist solely for that purpose, such as a central authority 
empowered to conduct prudential regulation, a central authority responsible for 
supervising and passing regulations for the conduct of business, a central bank 
responsible for monetary policy and a central authority responsible for regulating 
competition.139 This regulation is of horizontal application, see fig 1 below: 
 
Fig 1. The regulation/rules have horizontal application for example Prudential regulations 
apply to banks pensions, securities insurance etc. 
  
For functional regulation, the general view is that it is more important to regulate 
functions performed by financial services business than the types of business that 
undertake them, such as client assets and all conduct-of-business issues.140 
Functional regulation requires rules pertaining to function to be applied consistently 
to any business that discharges them, irrespective of the type of business.141 
Therefore if an institution performs several financial functions, these functions will be 
regulated separately depending on their nature.  
                                                 
139
  Mwenda KK (2006) 8-9. 
140
  Mwenda KK (2006) 9. 
141
  Mwenda KK (2006) 9. 
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Institutional regulation relates to the regulation of each single category of financial 
services by a different agency or division.142 Because of the vertical based manner in 
which this regulation model is structured, (vertical blocks like silos), institutional 
regulation is sometimes referred to as ‗regulation by silos‘143, see fig 2 below: 
 
Fig 2. The Different blocks/silos may be different authorities, agencies or divisions and 
divisions may be under a common authority at the top (such as the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi). 
However each block/silo will concentrate only on the financial services under it. 
 
Looking at functional and institutional regulation, similarities abound as even in 
institutional regulation it may be argued that it is function based (for example is it a 
banking function?). However the major difference may be that the former emphasises 
the setting up of departments in a supervisory agency that deal with non-sectoral 
functions as licensing, legal, accounting, enforcement etc. irrespective of type of 
business activity regulated whilst the latter encourages organisation into departments 
that deal separately with all aspects of specific types of business activities.144 
 
A unified regulator may be structured differently depending on jurisdictions. It may be 
a single central authority to regulate different institutions and functions and monitor 
fulfilment of regulatory objectives or it may deal solely with the securities and 
insurance industries or solely with the pension funds and insurance companies.145 
 
                                                 
142
  Mwenda KK (2006) 9-10. 
143
  Mwenda KK (2006) 10. 
144
  Mwenda KK (2006) 10. 
145
  Mwenda KK (2006) 11. 
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2.3 Single, twin peaks and multiple financial regulators 
In more developed financial markets such as Europe, three models are being 
practised; a three pillar model (banking, insurance and securities), a two pillar model 
(prudential versus conduct of business) and an integrated model (all types of 
supervision under one roof),146 the last being the unified regulator. However the 
choice of regulator whether, partially unified (normally where only two segments of 
the financial sector are supervised by a single regulator or a combination of the 
financial services) or fully unified (normally supervising all business activities in the 
financial sector) are contingent147 upon conditions obtaining in a country.148 As 
already stated, these may be economic, political, ideological and historical or a 
combination of these.149 
 
2.4 Independence of a financial services regulator 
But why should a financial services regulator be independent anyway? History 
provides examples that demonstrate that in nearly every major financial crisis of the 
past decade, political interference helped make a bad situation worse.150 Quintyn and 
Taylor note that political pressures not only weakened financial regulation generally, 
they also hindered regulators and the supervisors who enforce the regulations from 
taking action against banks that ran into trouble.151 In so doing they crippled the 
financial sector in the run-up to the crisis, delayed recognition of the severity of the 
crisis, slowed needed intervention, and raised the cost of the crisis to taxpayers.152  
 
But even governments averse to an ownership role in banking may find it foisted on 
them in a crisis.153 However, the authorities‘ focus then must be on getting out as 
quickly as possible, using the market, rather than government agencies, to identify 
                                                 
146
  Wymeersch E ‗The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe About Single, Twin Peaks and 
Multiple Financial Supervisors‘ (2007) European Business Organization Law Review 8: 237-306, 
(hereafter Wymeersch E (2007)) 237. 
147
  Mwenda KK (2006) 48. 
148
  See generally Briault C ‗The Rationale for a Single National Regulator‖ (1999) FSA Occasional 
Paper. 
149
  Mwenda KK (2006) 48. 
150
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
151
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
152
 Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
153
  Finances for growth : Choices in a volatile World (2001) The World Bank (hereafter Finances for 
growth (2001)) 2. 
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winners and losers.154 Drawing on public funds to recapitalize some banks may be 
unavoidable in truly systemic crises, but they must be used sparingly to leverage 
private funds and incentives.155 
 
Policymakers seem to have realised their limitations as in recent financial crises, 
policymakers in the countries affected sought to intervene in the work of regulators 
often with disastrous results.156 It is now increasingly recognised that political 
meddling has consistently caused or worsened financial instability.157  For example, 
in Collapse, former central bank president Ruth de Kivroy cited ineffective weak 
regulation and political interference as the cause of the Venezuelan crisis of 1994.158 
In East Asia, political interference in the regulatory and supervisory process 
postponed recognition of the severity of the crisis and ultimately the delayed action 
deepened the 1997/98 crisis.159  In Korea, for example, whilst the commercial banks 
were regulated by the central bank, specialised banks and other financial institutions 
were regulated by the finance ministry and the ministry‘s weak supervision 
encouraged excessive risk taking which helped lead to the 1997 crisis.160 In 
Indonesia there was a mixture of poorly enforced regulations and supervisors‘ 
reluctance to take action against politically well connected banks, especially those 
linked with the Suharto family and when the crisis hit, central bank procedures for 
dispensing liquidity support for troubled banks were overridden on the alleged direct 
instructions of the president.161  Lack of independence of financial supervisors in 
Japan‘s finance ministry weakened the country‘s financial sector and contributed to 
prolonged banking sector problems. Following a decline in the ministry‘s reputation in 
the late 1990s, the Japanese government created a new financial services agency to 
oversee banking, insurance and the securities markets, in part as an attempt to 
improve the independence of supervision.162 
  
                                                 
154
  Finances for growth (2001) 2. 
155
  Finances for growth (2001) 2. 
156
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
157
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004).  
158
 (2000) referred by Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004).  
159
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
160
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
161
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
162
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
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There seems to increasingly be a shift even by policymakers163 and policy analysts to 
shield financial sector regulators from political pressure to improve the quality of 
regulation and supervision with the ultimate goal of preventing financial crises.164 
Goodhart and Schoenmaker also observe a trend towards separation between 
monetary policy and supervisory agencies,165 in other words, leaving the central bank 
to concentrate on monetary policy and leaving regulation and supervision of the 
financial sector to supervisory agencies.  Achieving an efficient and secure financial 
market environment requires an infrastructure of legal rules and practice and timely 
and accurate information, supported by regulatory and supervisory arrangements 
that help ensure constructive incentives for financial market participants.166 
 
In passing laws that create regulatory agencies, politicians properly set and define 
regulatory and supervisory goals but once those laws are in force, regulators must be 
free to determine how to achieve those goals, and should be held accountable if they 
fail to achieve them.167 Independence must be looked from four related angles: 
regulatory, supervisory, institutional and budgetary.168  
 
Regulatory independence implies that the regulator has wide autonomy in setting at a 
minimum, prudential rules and regulations that follow from the special nature of 
financial intermediation.169 These rules and regulations concern the practices that 
financial institutions must adopt to maintain their safety and stability, including 
minimum capital adequacy ratios, exposure limits and loan provisioning.170  
Regulators who are able to set these rules independently are more likely to enforce 
them.171 They are also able to adapt the rules quickly and flexibly in response to 
changing conditions in the marketplace without having to go through a lengthy, high-
pressure political process.172 Regardless of the detail173 in a country‘s legislation, 
                                                 
163
 Including lawmakers - see for example the concern of Members of parliament in Malaŵi over 
Presidential influence over the RBM, Malaŵi‘s Financial Services Regulator – Sonani B ‗Cut 
President‘s powers over RBM – MPS‘ The Nation 10 December 2010 available at 
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independent regulators should be given ample discretion to set and change 
regulations within the broad confines of the country‘s and laws.174 
 
Supervisory independence denotes that the supervisory agency has independence to 
supervise the financial sector175 without undue influences.176 Whilst supervisory 
independence is crucial in the financial sector it is also difficult to establish and 
guarantee because supervisors work quite closely with financial institutions, not only 
in inspecting and monitoring them bust also enforcing sanctions and revoking 
licences.177 Much of their activity takes place outside public view, and interference 
with their work, either by politicians or by the industry can be subtle, and can take 
many forms.178 Steps to protect supervisor integrity include indemnifying supervisors 
from being personally sued for their work and providing financial incentives that allow 
supervisory agencies to attract and keep competent staff and discourage bribery.179 
Independent regulators, not a government agency or minister should be given the 
sole authority to grant and withdraw licenses not only because they best understand 
the financial sector‘s proper composition but also because the threat to revoke a 
license is a powerful supervisory tool in itself.180 
 
Institutional independence has to do with the agency‘s status outside the executive 
and legislative branches of government.181 It has three critical elements, first senior 
personnel should enjoy security of tenure; clear rules ideally involving two 
government bodies must govern their appointment and, especially dismissal.182 
Secondly the regulator‘s governance structure should consist of multi-member 
commissions composed of experts and thirdly decision making should be open and 
transparent to the extent consistent with commercial confidentiality, enabling both the 
public and the industry to scrutinise regulatory decisions.183 
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Budgetary independence relates to the regulator not being subjected to political 
pressure through its budgetary needs.184 Should funding come from the state, then it 
should be proposed and justified by the regulator following an objective market based 
criteria.185 Some regulators are funded through industry fees, a practice that 
minimises political interference but risks dependence on – and attracting interference 
from – the industry.186 And sometimes a fee based funding structure may leave the 
regulator strapped for funds during a crisis because that is precisely when the 
industry is most likely to have difficulty paying the fee.187 Regulators should therefore 
be allowed to build up reserve funds as insurance.188 Senior personnel should have 
the budgetary freedom to recruit staff as they see fit and to respond quickly to 
emerging needs.189  
 
It would however, be naïve to think that making financial regulatory and supervisory 
agencies independent solves or will solve all financial problems as well as future 
financial crises. This is partly because financial crises, though regrettably more 
frequent in recent decades, remain rare events and are often triggered by factors 
independent of the organisational structure of supervision.190 The literature on 
financial crises has not explored the relationship between institutional structure and 
the likelihood of severe financial sector problems or a full-blown financial crisis.191 
Although an independent regulator may not avoid a financial crisis from occurring,192  
what is clear, is that an independent financial services regulator has more chance of 
managing a crises than one who is not independent because for countries in financial 
crises where financial services regulators lacked independence, that tended to 
worsen the crisis.193 
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It needs to be appreciated that finance is inherently fragile, largely because of the 
inter-temporal leap in the dark that many financial transactions involve.194 Finance 
cannot be effective without credit, but credit means leverage, and leverage means 
the risk of failure, sometimes triggering a chain reaction (contagion).195  
 
If finance is fragile, banking is its most fragile part.196 Bankers have to place a reliable 
value on the assets they acquire (including the creditworthiness of borrowers).197  
Banking also adds the complications not only of maturity transformation, but of 
demandable debt, that is, offering debt finance backed by par value liabilities in the 
form of bank deposits.198 Polizatto says banks hold a unique position in most 
economies as creators of money, the principal depositories of the public's financial 
savings, the primary allocators of credit, and managers of the country's payment 
systems.199 For this reason, he argues, governments establish public policy for banks 
in the public interest and in most market economies, the goals of these policies are to 
control the supply of money, prevent systemic financial instability, and ameliorate 
concerns about the efficiency and equity of financial intermediation.200 The failure of 
any bank, no matter how small, may lead to contagion and loss of confidence in the 
system, unless the government can demonstrate its ability to handle bank failures in 
an orderly and systematic fashion.201 
 
The particular fragility of finance, and within it of banking, is true for all countries 
regardless of their income level, as attested to by the occurrence of banking crises in 
many industrial economies in the 1980s and 1990s202 as well as the recent global 
crisis. Developing countries face several additional sources of fragility.203 Not only 
are information problems in general more pronounced, but developing economies are 
also smaller and more concentrated in certain economic sectors or reliant on 
particular export products, and accordingly are less able to absorb shocks or pool 
isolated risks.204  
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2.5 Central bank independence 
Since the 1980s, more countries have freed their central banks from political control 
because evidence was growing that independent central banks had a successful 
record of achieving monetary stability – in other words, controlling inflation.205 As 
already seen, Goodhart and Schoenmaker cite the trend towards separation between 
monetary policy and supervisory agencies,206 so that central banks, apart from being 
independent as argued by Quintyn and Taylor, are also separated from financial 
supervisory and regulatory functions.207 Central bank independence is seen as 
essential to counter the natural preference of politicians for expansionary economic 
policies that promise short-term electoral gains at the risk of worsening inflation in the 
long run.208 Making central banks independent frees them from political pressure and 
thus removes the inflationary bias that could otherwise unsettle monetary policy.209 In 
most countries, such as Malaŵi, the finance minister will set out his fiscal policy in 
parliament with inflation targets. Most often than not, these are based on the need to 
win the vote of confidence of the taxpayer so that the economy is seen to be on the 
rise. If the central bank is not independent in such a scenario, the central bank will be 
forced to start adjusting the monetary policy to suit the tailor-made fiscal policy 
geared towards achieving cosmetic inflationary targets. 
 
Incentives for politicians to rescue failing banks are similar to those for inaction in the 
face of inflation.210 The decision to close a failing bank is usually unpopular and 
politicians eager to avoid a necessary closure may be tempted to pressure bank 
supervisors to organise a bailout or to excuse the failing bank from regulatory 
requirements, at the risk of worsening the problem and increasing long-term costs of 
resolving it.211 The same may also apply where politicians have connections with the 
failing bank, and here the reasons may not be as much not to make an unpopular 
decision as in not to make a decision that may not be in their own interests.212 This 
strengthens the case for regulatory and supervisory independence in the financial 
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sector.213 Bank regulatory independence is to financial stability what central bank 
independence is to monetary stability, and the independence of the two agencies can 
be mutually enforcing and both agencies also provide a public good – financial 
stability - which sets them apart from other sector-specific regulatory agencies.214 
 
2.6 Independent but accountable 
The issue of loss of state power may be of concern in granting independence to 
finance service regulators. Banking supervisory authority differs from central bank 
authority in one important way; when banking supervisors revoke a failing bank‘s 
licence, or run the bank as statutory manager,215 they are using the coercive power 
of the state (usually embodied in some form of legislation)216 against private citizens 
whilst when a central bank conducts monetary policy, they have no such coercive 
power and the uniqueness of this power by the regulator may be the basis of an 
argument against granting them independence.217 It would be naive to underplay 
these fears against creating an independent authority with state powers but instead it 
is suggested that governments should fully accept and take the implications of that 
power into account both by establishing strong accountability mechanisms to prevent 
abuse and recognising the need to employ highly qualified supervisors of 
demonstrable integrity and to pay them adequately.218   
 
In theory, independent regulators can decide on and conduct market interventions 
shielded from political interference and improve regulatory and supervisory 
transparency, stability and expertise.219 Growing evidence suggests that independent 
regulators have made regulation more effective, have led to smoother and more 
efficient operation of the market and are a distinct improvement over regulatory 
functions located in government ministries.220  
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A regulator needs legal protection from liability arising out of the proper discharge of 
its powers to ensure diligence, competence and independence.221 Having clear 
responsibilities, objectives, adequate powers, adequate resources (human capital, 
infrastructure and technology to process information in a timely manner),222 
transparency and accountability will make a regulator effective223 and reduce fears of 
it becoming a fourth arm of the state.224  The fear here is they are outside the control 
of the traditional three arms or branches that keep democratic systems in equilibrium 
through a system of checks and balances.225  
 
On the other hand, as Nobel Prize winning economist George J. Stigler pointed out, 
agencies tend to respond to the wishes of the best organised interest groups and 
when regulators are free from political control, the risk of ―regulatory‖ capture by 
other groups, - in particular the industry they regulate – grows,226 a view shared by 
Mwenda.227 Agencies that suffer from such capture come to identify industry interests 
(or even interests of individual firms) with the public interest and industry capture can 
undermine the effectiveness of regulation just as political pressure can.228 The 
general view is that a regulator must be operationally independent and accountable 
for the use of its powers whilst providing the right of appeal of its decisions and 
access to judicial review.229  The need for accountability will stop an independent 
regulator pursuing an agenda of its own and although fears of an independent 
regulator going on an agenda course of its own or becoming an uncontrollable fourth 
branch of the government appear exaggerated, they nevertheless demonstrate the 
need for proper forms of accountability to balance the advantages of regulatory 
independence with the disadvantages.230 
 
Therefore achieving both political independence and independence from the 
regulated industry, as well as accountability is essential and of these political 
independence remains the prime concern from the point of view of financial stability, 
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given the vested interests that many national governments still have in the banking 
system, and therefore, in bank regulation and supervision, as well as the dismal track 
record of political interference in regulatory and supervisory arrangements.231 
 
2.7 Regulatory models and systems in comparable countries 
 
United Kingdom 
Malaŵi‘s economy was once tied to the UK economy by virtue of colonialism. The 
influence of the UK‘s financial system can therefore not be overemphasised.232 The 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK is the unified regulator. It combines 
prudential, conduct of business and market conduct regulation across the full range 
of financial services, including banking, securities, investment management and 
insurance.233 But the FSA whilst being the more famous was not the first unified 
regulator with earlier integrated financial regulation being done in Scandinavia a 
decade before the FSA came into being.234 The FSA was the result of the merging of 
financial services regulation announced by the chancellor of the exchequer in May 
1997.235  The FSA merged the Securities and Investment Board and also took over 
the supervisory responsibilities of the Bank of England.236 The rationale for this 
merging was that the then existing arrangements of financial regulation involved a 
large number of regulators, each responsible for different parts of the industry and a 
glowing blurring of the distinctions between different kinds of financial services 
(banks, building societies, investment firms, insurance companies etc) made financial 
services regulation complex, inefficient, confusing237 and costly.238 However the 
coming in of the FSA did not mean it was the only body overseeing the financial 
services. The FSA works with the Bank of England and treasury and the 
responsibilities were thus divided: 
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 Treasury responsible for overall institutional structure of regulation and the 
governing legislation. 
 Bank of England responsible for: 
- overall stability of the financial system including the stability of the monetary 
system; 
- financial infrastructure (in particular payment systems) as well as for being 
able in ―exceptional‖ circumstances subject to the agreement of the Treasury 
to undertake official financial support operations; 
- efficiency and effectiveness of the financial sector. 
 FSA responsible for: 
- authorisation and supervision of financial services firms; 
- supervision of financial markets and of clearing and settlement systems; 
- conduct of market-based support operations not involving official finance in 
response to problems affecting firms, markets and clearing and settlement 
systems; 
- regulatory policy in all of these areas.239 
 
However, during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, the Bank of England and 
Treasury came to the rescue of failing financial institutions (mainly banks) prompting 
the biggest shake up since the formation of the FSA.240  The new Chancellor 
announced sweeping changes which may see the abolition of the existing tripartite 
regime between the FSA, Bank of England and Treasury. 241  If they come to fruition, 
these changes may not mean the scrapping the FSA but will have the effect of at 
least stripping it bare with prudential regulation moving to a new body reporting to the 
Bank of England, and a new agency being created to tackle serious economic 
crime.242 The new prudential regulator (the Prudential Regulatory Authority) will 
operate as a subsidiary of the Bank of England and will carry out prudential 
regulation of financial firms, including banks, investment banks, building societies 
and insurers.243 The New Consumer Protection and Markets Authority will regulate 
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the conduct of every authorised financial firm providing services to consumers.244 
Whether this includes firms other than those currently authorised by the FSA (for 
example credit providers and intermediaries) remains to be seen,245 but clearly the 
FSA‘s prowess will have been reduced. In going this route, the UK will create a ‗twin 
peaks‘ system separating prudential and conduct regulation but this bucks the trend 
of moves within the EU in the recent past to consolidate and unify financial 
regulation.246 Clearly the decision to change the regulatory framework maybe political 
but it may also have been self-made because of regulatory failure. Mwenda has 
described the failure of financial regulation as one of the most important causes of 
this global economic crisis.247 However, he argues that in order to avoid experiencing 
such a crisis again, the solution lies in designing and implementing more effective 
regulatory frameworks for financial institutions.248 It would therefore seem that the 
solution lies not in removing regulatory bodies, or dismantling them as proposed in 
the UK but making them more stringent and effective. 
 
Despite the announcement of these plans, the FSA is still intact 249 and as late as 
March 2011 issued a publication on updated guidelines across its constituency.250 
Pronouncements that the FSA is dead may therefore prove to have been immature. 
For now, the FSA remains the single financial service regulator of the UK. 
 
Zambia 
Malaŵi and Zambia share many roots. Courtesy of being former British colonies, they 
all inherited the English Common law and principles of equity.251 The two countries 
share common languages and ethnic groupings (Chewas, Ngonis, Tumbukas and 
Tongas).252 Both were under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.253  Whilst 
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the Zambian economy took an industrial route courtesy of discovery of copper, the 
Malaŵi economy has largely remained agro-based, although the recent discovery of 
uranium may change that. The opening of the Kayekera Uranium mine operated by 
Paladin Africa254 and prospects of more mines are likely to change the economic 
landscape of Malaŵi. At the moment, the Zambian economy would therefore be like 
the ‗bigger brother‘.255 In both countries lack of liquidity is a serious impediment to the 
efficient functioning of their stock markets.256 Malaŵi and Zambia even share the 
same local name for their currency, the Kwacha.257 These legal, political, historical 
and economic similarities make Zambia the ideal comparative country. 
 
In Zambia, the Banking and Financial Services Act 1994 (BFSA) is the legislative 
cornerstone for the regulation and supervision of banks and financial institutions.258 
Closely related to the BFSA is the Bank of Zambia Act 1996.259 Mwenda says that 
although the Bank of Zambia (BOZ) provides for a mechanism of independence, 
BOZ is not independent and to a large extent operates under the executive arm of 
the state.260 The bank itself admits that lack of operational autonomy is the major 
challenge it faces as a central bank.261 The governor of BOZ has argued that the 
tenure of office of the bank governor should not run concurrently with the term of 
office of a particular government to enhance professionalism and remove 
patronage.262 A similar problem of the central bank governor‘s tenure has been 
raised by Kalilombe in the case of Malaŵi.263 The World Bank says a solution which 
also can help ensure the quality of regulatory oversight, is fixed and long terms for 
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the central bank governor, ending the ability of the executive to remove them without 
a solid majority of parliament.264 
 
In Zambia, the registrar of banks and financial institutions authorises companies to 
conduct banking and financial services.265 The registrar is based at the central bank 
and BOZ for all intents and purposes is the competent authority regulating and 
supervising banks and financial institutions.266 Zambia has a twin peak unified 
system of financial services supervision.267 On the one hand BOZ has separate 
departments to supervise banks and non banking financial institutions, on the other, 
the Pensions and Insurance Authority (PIA) is responsible for supervising insurance 
companies and pension funds, even though both are in essence nonbanking financial 
institutions not much different from those supervised by BOZ.268 Mwenda says this 
‗anomaly‘ may be because either under section 2 of the BFSA, pension funds and 
insurance companies are not recognised as financial institutions that carry on 
―financial services business other than banking business‖ or the relevant department 
in BOZ is concerned only with the regulation and supervision of nonbanking financial 
institutions that accepts deposits taking or provide loans.269  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the theoretical underpinnings of financial services 
regulation, its rationale as well as models of financial services regulation and 
supervision.  
 
The chapter examined the requirements that independence must be looked from four 
related angles: regulatory, supervisory, institutional and budgetary. In examining 
these ‗yardsticks‘ for independence, the chapter also examined the requirements for 
a regulator to be truly independent. To attain regulatory independence, the regulator 
must have wide autonomy in setting prudential regulations that follow from the 
special nature of financial intermediation. Supervisory independence requires 
independence to supervise the financial sector without undue influences. It was 
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noted that supervisory independence is difficult to establish and guarantee because 
supervisors work quite closely with financial institutions. Institutional independence 
has to do with the agency‘s status outside the executive and legislative branches of 
government and involves three critical elements; security of tenure of senior 
personnel;  having a governance structure of multi-member commissions composed 
of experts and transparency in decision making but consistent with commercial 
confidentiality.  
 
The Chapter also looked at the benefits of having an independent financial services 
regulator as well as the need to be accountable so as to allay fears of the regulator 
being branded a fourth estate. Because of the central role that banks play in the 
financial sector, the chapter also looked at central banks and how making them 
independent from (excessive) political manipulation can improve their performance. 
In this regard the security of tenure of the governor of the central bank is a key factor.  
 
The Chapter ends with a comparative study of the financial service regulatory and 
supervisory systems in the UK and Zambia. The UK has a unified single regulator 
whilst Zambia has a twin peak system. As will be seen in the next chapter, Malaŵi 
has a unified (single peak) regulatory system but there are strong comparisons to the 
legal and operation framework of Malaŵi and Zambia. The next chapter critically 
analyses the current financial services regulatory framework of Malaŵi.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
3.  The Financial Service Regulatory System in Malaŵi  
3.1. Overview of the contextual framework 
Malaŵi gained independence from Great Britain in 1964 and became a Republic in 
1966.270 Before becoming a Republic, Malaŵi used the Union Jack,271 the British 
Pound Sterling and sang ‗God Save the Queen!‘272 On attaining Republican status, 
Malaŵi politically delinked its economy from Britain and set up its own financial 
system, with the Malaŵi Kwacha as the new currency. The Kwacha was however still 
fixed to the British Pound Sterling up to 1973 when world-wide economic difficulties 
precipitated by the oil price shocks of the 1973/1974 and general problems 
associated with the fixed exchange rate regimes led to its abandonment and a 
search for other fiscal solutions for the stabilisation of its currency.273    
 
However, almost 47 years after political independence and 45 years after financial 
independence, Malaŵi remains one of the Least Developing Countries (LDC) and its 
situation is exacerbated by the fact that it is also landlocked. Malaŵi is therefore a 
Land-Locked Least Developing Country (LLDC)274 and amongst the poorest in the 
world.275 Poverty is a fact and remains a key challenge.276  Real per capita GDP 
stood at 189 USD in 2009.277  Progress has however, been made in tackling poverty 
and other social challenges.278 Increased household food security and falling poverty 
have complimented strong macroeconomic performance.279 The government 
estimates that the poverty headcount has fallen from 52.4% in 2005 to 40% in 
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http://www.visitmalawi.mw/About%20Malawi/aboutmalawi.htm (accessed 1 January 2011). 
271
 The flag for Great Britain. 
272
 Great Britain national anthem. 
273
  Ndaferankhande MD & Ndhlovu TM ‗Inflationary experiences in Malawi: An investigation of the 
underlying determinants‘ (2006) 14 available at www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2006-
EOI.../Ndaferankhande.pdf (accessed 1 January 2011). 
274
  ‗UN-OHRLLS : Least Developed Countries‘ available at  http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/ 
(accessed 22 August 2010). 
275
  But see summary of ‗United Nations General Assembly Debate : 65
th
 Session, President Bingu wa 
Mutharika, Malawi‘ available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/65/meetings/generaldebate/View/SpeechView/tabid/85/smid/411/ArticleID/
101/reftab/224/t/Malawi/Default.html (accessed 23 March 2011). 
276
  ‗African Economic Outlook : Malawi‘ available at 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/southern-africa/malawi/ (accessed 17 
September 2010). (hereafter African Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010)). 
277
  African Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010). 
278
  African Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010). 
279
 African Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010). 
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2009.280 Overall well-being remains low, but is improving, as measured by the UN 
Human Development Index score of 0.493 that ranks Malaŵi at 160 out of 182 
countries in 2009, up from 164 out of 177 in 2007/08.281 Macroeconomic indicators 
have put Real GDP Growth for 2008, 2009,282 2010 and 2011 at 9.8, 7.0, 6.0 and 
6.2.283  
 
Malaŵi is a constitutional supremacy, 284 a situation that came about after the 1993 
referendum that ushered in multiparty democracy285 and a new democratic 
Constitution.286 The system of government is that of an executive presidency. 
Although constitutionally there are three arms of Government (executive, legislature 
and judiciary) the State President is head of the three arms apart from being head of 
Government.287 At the conferences that led to the new Constitution in 1992-3, the 
issue of limiting the president‘s powers was topical, especially coming from days of 
one party dictatorship under Kamuzu Banda. In the end Malaŵi ended up with a 
Constitution that can best be described as a hybrid of the American (presidential) 
system and the British (parliamentary) system but more inclined to the presidential 
system. In Malaŵi, the president is therefore a very powerful legal personality and his 
decisions and exercise of discretion has a profound effect on all facets of the country. 
 
The financial sector in Malaŵi is not very well developed and is reflective of its rather 
small economy and size.288 The banking sector dominates the financial sector.289 
                                                 
280
  African Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010). 
281
  African Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010). 
282
  In 2009, Malaŵi experienced some financial setbacks, including a general shortage of foreign 
exchange, which has damaged its ability to pay for imports and  investment fell 23% - ‗Malawi 
Economy 2011‘ theodora available at 
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/malawi/malawi_economy.html (accessed 17 September 2010). 
283
  African Economic Outlook : Malawi (2010). 
284
  Sections 4,5, 199, The Constitution of the Republic of Malaŵi, 1994. 
285
 There has been debate that the first multi-party elections were actually held in 1961 when  self-
governance was attained but this debate is outside the scope of this paper. 
286
 Much more similar to the South African Constitution it must be said. There is a fluid debate of which 
one preceded the other see - Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others (2007) 28 
ILJ 2405 (CC) 2426 para 55. 
287
 The Constitution treats the three arms as equal but with different functions – see ss 7,8 & 9 of the 
Constitution. 
288
  It has a population of 15.8 million and a total area of 118,484 sq km out of which 24,404 sq km is 
water with a real per capita GDP of 189 US dollars (USD) in 2009 - African Economic Outlook : 
Malawi (2010)  & ‗Malawi population‘ IndexMundi available at 
http://www.indexmundi.com/malawi/population.html (accessed 23 March 2011).  
289
  ‗2010 Index of Economic Freedom‘ The Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street Journal, available 
at http://www.heritage.org/index/country/malawi (accessed 17 September 2010). (hereafter Index 
of Economic Freedom (2010)). 
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Eleven commercial banks290 offer a variety of services and generally allocate credit 
on market terms.291 However, high credit costs and scarce access to financing hinder 
more vibrant business activity.292 The economic fundamentals do not lend 
themselves attractive to the development of a saving culture. For example, although 
the 12-month inflation rate for January 2011 is officially293 at 6%, bank rate is at 13%,  
savings rate ranges from 0.75 to 2.5% whilst the lending rate ranges from 17.75 to 
23.75%.294 There is therefore the situation that the savings rate is not attracting 
enough savings which can be used to lend out.  
 
The alternative for those who may wish to invest seems to be the securities market. 
However, the securities markets are not fully developed and activity on the Malaŵi 
Stock Exchange (MSE), the only stock exchange remains very limited.295 The MSE 
has one tier trading arrangement under the Malaŵi All Share Index (MASI) although it 
recently introduced the Alternate Capital Market (ACM).296 The ACM is yet to see any 
listing. The ACM is supposed to cover small business which could not meet the 
regulatory rigours of those listed under the MASI. 297 The reasons for this lack of 
enthusiasm may need to be researched further. 
 
The financial sector of Malaŵi is still at a rudimentary stage with low public 
confidence as reflected in the illiquidity of the MSE.298 The turnover velocity, an 
indicator of the liquidity of assets traded on the market was 1.33 % in 2009 compared 
to 3.33 % recorded in 2008299 (refer to Appendix A for a table of trading in 2009). The 
                                                 
290
 See Appendix C. 
291
  Index of Economic Freedom (2010). 
292
  Index of Economic Freedom (2010). 
293
 There is always ongoing debate as to whether the official figures reflect the situation on the ground. 
However the 6.60 is an average comprising of  two components :  Non-Food 10.70%  and Food  
2.90% - ‗Reserve Bank of Malawi‘ available at http://www.rbm.mw/  (accessed 23 March 2011). 
294
 ‗Reserve Bank of Malawi‘ available at  http://www.rbm.mw/  (accessed 23 March 2011). 
295
  Index of Economic Freedom (2010). 
296
 It is submitted that the MSE may have to reconsider changing the name from ACM to Alternative 
Securities Market in line with the Securities Act which replaced the Capital Market Development 
Act as well as in line with financial trends. 
297
 See ‗Guidelines to listing on the Malawi Stock Exchange: Alternative Capital Market‘ available at 
http://www.mse.co.mw/rules/ALTERNATIVE2.pdf  (accessed 23 March 2011). 
298
  For example the MSE registered no trading in the week 6-10 September, 2010 (11 September was 
a holiday) see – Chiyembekeza C ‗Stock market closes 4-day trading week flat‘ The Nation 13 
September 2010 available at 
http://www.nationmw.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5770:stock-market-
closes-4-day-trading-week-flat&catid=11:business-news&Itemid=4 (accessed 17 September 2010).  
A practical example of illiquidity of the MSE was when the author failed to sell shares in two 
listed companies for more than 6 months! 
299
  ‗Malawi Stock Exchange : Annual Market Performance Review 2009‘ MSE available at 
http://www.mse.co.mw/current/annual.pdf (accessed 17 September 2010). 
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MSE has been in existence since 1994 but started equity trading in November 1996 
when it first listed National Insurance Company Limited (NICO).300 Prior to the first 
listing, the major activities undertaken were provision of a facility for secondary 
market trading in Government of Malaŵi bonds namely, Treasury Bills and Local 
Registered Stocks.301  
 
The MSE was licensed under the Capital Market Development Act 1990302 (CDMA) 
and Companies Act 1984.303 The Securities Act 2010 has replaced the CDMA. The 
Securities Act provides for the main legislative framework for securities regulation in 
Malaŵi. The MSE now operates under the Securities Act. Malaŵi is also part of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC)304 and Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).305 Its membership of both organisations 
has raised debate but such a discussion is outside the scope of this work. Most of the 
members of SADC306 and COMESA307 have illiquid stock markets too.308  
 
3.2. Financial sector regulation and supervision 
The overarching regulatory framework for the financial sector is the Financial 
Services Act 2010 (FSAM).  The Act defines the ―financial services law‖ (FSL) as 
comprising the following acts; Reserve Bank of Malaŵi Act 1989, Banking Act 2009, 
Securities Act 2010, Microfinance Act 2010, Insurance Act 2009, Credit Reference 
Bureau Act 2010, Building Society Act 1964, Financial Services Act 2010, Pension 
Act 2010[sic], Financial Cooperatives Act 2010[sic].309 
 
                                                 
300
  ‗Malawi Stock Exchange : Company Profile‘ available at http://www.mse.co.mw/prof.html 
(accessed 18 September 2010). (hereafter Malawi Stock Exchange – Company Profile (2010)). 
301
  Malawi Stock Exchange : Company Profile (2010). 
302
 Chap 46:06 of the Laws of Malaŵi. Hereafter Capital Markets Development Act or CMDA. 
303
  Malawi Stock Exchange : Company Profile (2010). The Companies Act 1984 (hereafter Companies 
Act). 
304
  See Southern Africa Development Community available at http://www.sadc.int/ (accessed 17 
September 2010). 
305
  See  The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa available at http://www.comesa.int/ 
(accessed 17 September 2010). 
306
  Except the JSE in South Africa which is liquid by African standards. 
307
  Except for NSE in Kenya and EGX in Egypt. 
308
  See Marone H (2003) 11 and see generally Mwenda KK (2000). 
309
  Section 2 , Financial Services Act 2010 (hereafter Financial Services Act ). The pensions Bill has 
not been enacted and the Financial Cooperatives Act has just been enacted in 2011. 
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The definitions includes some bills310 as if they are acts and it is submitted that this 
was in anticipation of their passing.  The Exchange Control Act is not included and it 
is the author‘s view that this omission was by error and not design.311 
 
3.2.1. The Constitution 
 
Although the Constitution is not included amongst the FSL, it plays a crucial role in 
the overall scheme of things. First, it is the supreme law of the land312 and any law or 
act of government inconsistent with it is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. 313 
 
The Constitution also provides for judicial review by the High Court for any law or 
administrative action or decision of the government.314 Government has always been 
construed broadly and includes any organ exercising public authority.315 The 
Constitution also provides for the right to administrative justice316  which provides for 
the right to lawful and procedurally fair administrative action, which is justifiable in 
relation to reasons given where those rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or 
interests are affected or threatened.317 It also provides for the right to be furnished 
with reasons in writing for such administrative action.318 Under the maxim ubi jus ibi 
remedium,319 the courts are enjoined to provide a remedy where any fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Constitution has been violated320 and the court has the power 
to award compensation where it considers it to be appropriate in the circumstances 
of a particular case.321 
 
This provides everyone (natural and juristic persons) with the right to challenge 
administrative action and this right avails to a financial institution which may have its 
rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations and interests affected by any regulatory 
decision. 
                                                 
310
  At least at the time the Act was passed. 
311
  This is because financial Bureaux de Change are regulated by the Exchange Control Act and are 
for purposes of the Act financial institutions. 
312
  Sections 4, 199 the Constitution of the Republic of Malaŵi,1994 (hereafter Constitution). 
313
  Section 5 Constitution. 
314
 Section 108(2) Constitution. 
315
 See The State v The Chief Secretary to the President; Ex Parte Dr Bakili Muluzi, Misc. Civil 
Application No 3 of 2011 (HC) Mzuzu Registry (unreported).  
316
 Section 43 Constitution. 
317
 Section 43(a). 
318
 Section 43(b). 
319
  For every right, there is a remedy; where there is no remedy, there is no right. 
320
 Section 46(2)(b). 
321
 Section 46(4). 
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The Constitution also has a whole chapter dedicated to the RBM albeit containing 
only two sections.322 But what is more revealing is not the contents of the chapter but 
the fact that the drafters323 decided to give recognition to the RBM in a separate 
chapter. Chapter XIXI states: 
s. 185. 1. There shall be established by an Act of Parliament a central bank of the Republic, 
known as the Reserve Bank of Malawi which shall serve as the State's principal 
instrument for the control of money supply, currency and the institutions of finance and 
shall serve generally in accordance with the normal functions of a central bank. 
2. The Bank shall be controlled by a Board which shall consist of a chairman and 
members of the Board who shall, subject to this Constitution, be appointed in 
accordance with the Act of Parliament by which the Bank is established. 
 
3.2.2. Central Bank 
 
 Legal structure :  
 
Section 3 of the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi Act (RBMA) states that the principal 
objectives of the RBM shall be: 
‗(a) to issue legal tender currency in Malawi;  
(b) to act as banker and adviser to the Government; 
(c) to maintain external reserves so as to safeguard the international value of the 
Malawi currency;  
(d) to implement measures designed to influence the money supply and the 
availability of credit, interest rates and exchange rates with the view to promoting 
economic growth, employment, stability in prices and a sustainable balance of 
payments position ;  
(e) to promote a sound financial structure in Malawi, including payment systems, 
clearing systems and adequate financial services;  
(f) to promote a money and capital market in Malawi;  
(g) to act as lender of last resort to the banking system;  
(h) to supervise banks and other financial institutions;  
(i) to collect economic data of the financial and other sectors for research and policy 
purposes; and  
(j) to promote development in Malawi.‘324 
                                                 
322
 Chapter XIX. 
323
 Given this is a 1994 Constitution, the term ‗our fathers‘ in reference to those who came up with the 
Constitution may really not apply for a considerable period of time! 
324
  Underlining supplied. 
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Clearly the RBM has a lot of ‗principal‘ objectives. What is worth noting is that the 
RBMA does not use the word ‗regulate‘ as part of the principal objectives of the 
RBM. It is however argued that not much should be read in this as the functions 
of the RBM under the RBMA and FSL are both regulatory and supervisory. 
 
The RBMA defines financial institution as any person, other than a bank, 
registered as a financial institution under the Banking Act.325 The term other 
financial institutions is defined to include financial institutions and pensions, 
assurance and insurance institutions.326  The Banking Act 2009327 has removed 
the definition for a financial institution since financial institutions are now 
registrable under the now specific legislation comprising the FSL. 
 
 
 Political structure of the central bank  
 
The governor and deputy governor of the RBM are appointed exclusively by the 
President.328 The board of directors of the RBM is also appointed exclusively by the 
President and comprises the governor, deputy governor, and five other directors who 
may include secretary to the treasury, secretary for economic planning and 
development and the accountant general.329 The governor (or deputy governor in the 
governor‘s absence) chairs the board of directors.330  
                                                 
325
 Section 2 RBM Act. 
326
  Section 2, RBM Act. 
327
 Discussed below (the RBM Act originally referred to the repealed Banking Act but should now be 
read as referring to the Banking Act 2009). Any reference in the text to the Banking Act is to the 
Banking Act 2009 and the old Act will be referred to as the repealed Banking Act). 
328
  Section 12 RBM Act; s 6 of the RBM Amendment Bills proposed the appointment of not more than 
three deputy governors (up from the present one) and not more than seven directors – see  Sonani 
B ‗Cut President‘s powers over RBM – MPS‘ The Nation 10 December 2010 available at 
http://www.nationmw.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10828:cut-presidents-
powers-over-rbmmps&catid=11:business-news&Itemid=4  (accessed 13 December 2010). 
329
  Section 6 RBM Act. See Appendix D for the Current list of Board Members. 
330
  Section 11 RBM Act. 
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Fig 3 The organisational structure of the RBM
331
 
 
At independence, Malaŵi was a de jure multi-party state but a de facto one party 
state by virtue of the absolute dominance of the Malaŵi Congress Party (MCP).332 
The de facto position of the MCP was translated into a de jure reality in 1966 when 
the country became a one party state, with Dr Banda as Executive President.333 Five 
years later, Ngwazi Dr H Kamuzu Banda was proclaimed ‗President for life‘ with the 
                                                 
331
  Redrawn and extracted without names from ‗Reserve Bank : About the Reserve Bank of Malawi‘ 
available at http://www.rbm.mw/aboutrbm.aspx (accessed 30 March 2011). 
332
  There were minority parties (reflecting mainly racial lines) when Malaŵi became Independent in 
1964 following the general elections of 1961 but this changed after 1966 and following the 
(in)famous ―cabinet crisis‖ when Dr. Banda reinforced his reigns on power. 
333
  ‗Malawi: Era of One Party Rule (1964-1992)‘ in Lodge T, Kadima D & Pottie D Compendium of 
Elections in Southern Africa (2002) (hereafter Lodge T, Kadima D & Pottie D (2002)) 124 
available at http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/malonepartyrule.htm (accessed 25 March 2011). 
 
Key :  • Admin - Administration 
 ICT – Information & Communication Technology 
 Mngt – Management 
 NPS – National Payment Systems 
 PS – Protective Services 
 PR – Public Relations 
 
Director 
Admin 
General  
Manager 
Operations 
Board 
Governor 
Deputy Governor 
General  
Manager 
Economic  
Services 
General 
Manager 
Supervision 
of Financial 
Institutions 
Director 
Bank  
Supervision 
Director 
Micro-Finance 
&  
Capital 
Markets 
Supervision 
Director 
Pensions & 
Insurance 
Supervision 
Director 
Research  
& Statistics 
Director 
Financial 
Markets  
Director 
Exchange 
Control 
Director 
NPS 
Director 
Strategy  
& Risk Mngt 
Director 
Human 
Resources 
Director 
Accounting 
& Finance 
Director 
PS 
Director 
Banking  
& 
Currency 
Mngt 
Director 
ICT 
Director 
Governor’s 
office & PR 
Director 
Internal 
Audit 
General 
Counsel & 
Bank 
Secretary 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
strange insertion of this proclamation in the country‘s Constitution!334 Malaŵi has 
therefore been a de facto and de jure one-party state for most of its existence.335 
Through a referendum in 1993, Malaŵians voted for a multiparty system and in 1994 
Malaŵi had multi-party elections with a new Constitution336 in place and presidential 
term that runs for five years with a maximum of two terms.337 Malaŵi has had only 
three Presidents since it became independent; Dr. Kamuzu Banda,338 Dr. Bakili 
Muluzi339 and Professor Bingu wa Mutharika.340 
 
During the same time, the RBM has had eleven governors since its inception in 
1965.341 The average term of a governor since independence is approximately 4.7 
years, almost equal to the 5-year post-one-party political cycle.342 The nominal term 
of the governor is 5 years and the incumbent is eligible for reappointment.343 The 
longest serving governor of the RBM was John Tembo344 who served during the one-
party era.345 The shortest serving is A.G. Perrin, the first governor who only served a 
year.346  
 
An examination of the governor turnover rate after the advent of multiparty 
democracy347 indicates an average drop to 4.5 years.348 An interesting pattern is that 
there is a change in the governor within a year after every general election in the 
multiparty era.349 For example, Dr. Mathews Chikaonda replaced Francis 
                                                 
334
 Lodge T, Kadima D & Pottie D (2002) 124. 
335
  From 1966 when it became a Republic to 1994. There were minority parties when Malaŵi became 
Independent in 1964 following the general elections of 1961 but this changed after 1966 and 
following the (in)famous ―cabinet crisis‖ when Dr. Banda reinforced his reigns on power. 
336
  Although the Constitution is designated as a 1994 legislation, the 1994 Constitution was interim 
and was only made sacrosanct in 1995, the notable removal from it being the senate. 
337
  Section 83, The Constitution of the Republic of Malaŵi, 1994. 
338
  1964-1994. 
339
  1994-2004. 
340
  2004-present (constitutionally up to 2014). 
341
  See Kalilombe L Central Bank Governance, Accountability and Independence: The Case of 
Reserve Bank of Malawi (unpublished MA thesis, University of Kwazulu-Natal, 2008) (hereafter 
Kalilombe (2008)) at 40 but add Dr. Perks Ligoya, the current Governor appointed in 2009. 
342
  Kalilombe (2008) 40. 
343
  ‗SADC Bankers: Reserve Bank of Malawi‘ Committee of Central Bank Governors in SADC ) 
available at 
http://www.sadcbankers.org/SADC/SADC.nsf/LADV/E4E3EF0D1F5967B8422576740044D454/$File/
Malawi-.pdf   (accessed 25 March 2011) (hereafter SADC Bankers: Reserve Bank of Malawi (2011)). 
344
  (1971-1984) Famous Politician and now Leader of Opposition (one of the oldest serving Members 
of Parliament). See ‗Reserve Bank : About the Reserve Bank of Malawi‘ available at 
http://www.rbm.mw/aboutrbm.aspx (accessed 25 March 2011). 
345
  Kalilombe (2008) 40. 
346
  Kalilombe (2008) 40. 
347
  Referendum was in 1993 and General Elections were held in 1994. 
348
  Kalilombe (2008) 40. 
349
  Kalilombe (2008) 41. 
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Perekamoyo as governor in 1995 soon after the 1994 elections.350  Dr. Chikaonda 
was replaced by Dr. Elias Ngalande in 2000 after the 1999 elections whilst Dr. 
Ngalande himself was replaced by Victor Mbewe in 2005 after the 2004 elections.351 
Mbewe was replaced by the current Governor, Dr. Perks Ligoya, months after the 
May 2009 general elections.352 But as Kalilombe cautions,  
‗care should be taken in interpreting these values because low turnover sometimes 
may mean lower independence of the Central Bank.  A subservient governor may 
stay in the seat for a longer time if he does what the politicians want him to do‘.353   
 
John Tembo was a long time Banda confidant. It is submitted that Tembo‘s long 
survival was exactly because he was part of the MCP structure and represented the 
executive interest and was therefore seen as subservient.354 The influence of the 
executive arm (especially the presidency) on the RBM through the appointment of its 
governor and board is therefore self-evident, especially in the post-one-party era 
where each presidential term seems to coincide with a new governor of the RBM. 
Clearly this cannot be a mere coincidence and is reflective of different policy views of 
not only each president but each term of each presidency. It can therefore be said 
that from an analysis of the available information, the conclusion could be drawn that 
currently the job of governor of the RBM is a very precarious one providing no 
security of tenure.355  
 
 The central bank as regulator and supervisor of financial institutions 
 
The FSL makes the RBM the regulator and the supervisor of financial institutions in 
Malaŵi. Most of the FSL is new law and the RBM has been in existence since 1965. 
The RBM may have changed with time, but it is submitted that it has only adapted 
based on its original mandate. The avalanche of laws comprising the FSL may 
therefore be too much for the RBM considering that it has a plethora of other 
principal functions.356 
                                                 
350
  Kalilombe (2008) 41. 
351
  Kalilombe (2008) 41. 
352
  In September 2009, see Gondwe G ‗Reserve Bank of Malawi appoints new governor‘ available at 
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/415/87/40038.html (accessed 9 October 2010). 
353
 Kalilombe (2008) 20 
354
 He was still Treasurer-General of the Party! 
355
 See Appendix E for a complete list of Governors of the RBM and the years served. 
356
 Actually supervising financial institutions is but one of the 10 principal functions of the RBM – see s 3  
RBM Act. 
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 Malaŵi is however not unique in having a central bank as the regulator and 
supervisor of the financial sector. The Netherlands, Antilles, Singapore and Uruguay 
are some of the countries with the peculiar regulatory system where the central bank 
and not a separate agency regulate securities firms and insurance companies as well 
as banks.357 The fact that it is a rather unique, and in some ways peculiar system 
means it may not provide the best results and if one looks at the data which reveals 
that the executive (presidency) has a firm grasp of the central bank through the 
authority to appoint the governor and the board, then whilst the central bank maybe 
the de jure regulator, the President is the de facto regulator and supervisor of 
financial institutions. This, it is submitted, is a not an ideal situation for financial 
growth. It is further submitted that that the RBM may not pass an objective test of 
independence.  
 
 Regulatory structure of the central bank 
 
By law the RBM is the single regulator regulating and supervising all financial sectors 
including banks, pension services, insurance companies, discount houses and the 
MSE. To achieve its supervision and regulation, the RBM employs the silo matrix358 
of financial services regulation and supervision.  
 
The head office of the bank is in the capital city, Lilongwe and the bank has one 
branch in Blantyre,359 although a second branch is being built in Mzuzu. The head 
office is charged with all the functions of a central bank.360 The main function of the 
branch in Blantyre is currency issue and supervision of financial institutions.361 All the 
banks and financial institutions are headquartered in Blantyre although there is a 
slow trek to the capital.362 This may explain why the Blantyre branch of the RBM was 
tasked with supervisory powers. 
 
                                                 
357
  Mwenda KK (2006) 53. 
358
  See Mwenda KK (2006) 6. 
359
 SADC Bankers: Reserve Bank of Malawi (2011) 98. 
360
 SADC Bankers: Reserve Bank of Malawi (2011) 98. 
361
 SADC Bankers: Reserve Bank of Malawi (2011) 98. 
362
 Standard Bank has announced it will move, but it seem the only bank to have thus indicated. About 
a decade ago, NBS Bank moved to Blantyre to ―the Banking Square‖ which houses most of the 
headquarters of all the banks in Malaŵi. 
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The bank has its own budget approved annually by the board363 but in view of the 
manner in which the board is appointed, it is submitted that this does not offer the 
requisite budgetary independence. 
 
 
 
Fig 4. The structure of the RBM as it relates to supervision of financial institutions.
364
 
 
 
The RBM operates a rather slim silo matrix with only three365 silos;  
- bank supervision,  
- micro-finance & capital markets supervision, and ; 
- pension & insurance supervision. 
 
It is submitted that bank supervision must be construed broadly to include other 
financial institutions that do not fall in the other two categories. The three directorates 
in fig 5 below are therefore for all the supervision and regulation falling under their 
                                                 
363
 SADC Bankers: Reserve Bank of Malawi (2011) 97. 
364
 Extracted from the organisational structure of the RBM. 
365
  A recent improvement from two in 2009. 
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directorate (silo). From this slim structure it can be seen that the directorates have a 
lot on their plate.366 
 
 
Fig 5. The 3 silos under which regulation and supervision is structured within the RBM.367 
 
 
3.2.3. Banking Act 2009 (BA2009) 
 
The BA2009 defines a bank as a person who conducts banking business in 
Malaŵi and banking business is defined as the business of receiving deposits or 
deposit substitutes from the public that are payable with or without interest or after 
the expiry of a stated period or that are transferable by cheque or other means.368 
No person369 may operate as a bank without a banking licence granted by the 
RBM370 and only a licensed bank can advertise that it performs banking services 
in Malaŵi.371 The registrar has the power to require an institution be licensed as a 
bank if he determines that the institution is in fact engaged in banking business.372  
                                                 
366
  With the passing of The Pensions Bill, the Pension & Insurance Directorate may have resultantly 
attained further expansive powers. 
367
  In light of the repeal of the Capital Markets Development Act, it is submitted that the Directorate 
responsible for Micro-Finance & Capital Markets is also responsible for the Securities Markets. 
368
  Section 2(1) Banking Act 2009 (hereafter Banking Act). 
369
 The Registrar shall not license a person as a bank unless the person is a body corporate – s 4(2) 
Banking Act . 
370
 Section 2(1) Banking Act. The licence is granted under the Financial Services Act. 
371
 Section 44 Banking Act. 
372
  Section 4(3) Banking Act. 
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The BA2009 does not define who the registrar of banks is but provides that words 
and expression in the act have the meanings ascribed to them in the Financial 
Services Act 2010 (FSAM).373 The BA2009 provides requirements and conditions 
for licensing,374 prudential supervision375 and monetary supervision.376 A rather 
broadly vague licensing condition is the interest of the national economy and the 
public interest.377 The prudential supervision is however periodical or at the 
registrar‘s discretion.378 The BA2009 also provides for winding379 up of banks over 
and above any other law.380 The registrar has power to act on troubled banks381 
including placing them under statutory management382 or even closure.383 Where 
a bank is being wound up or liquidated, a court of law shall not entertain any 
application for a stay of such proceedings unless the application is brought by the 
registrar,384 who may also be the liquidator.385 
 
3.2.4. The Securities Act 2010 (SA2010) 
 
The SA2010 is the successor to the CMDA and expansively defines securities.386 
Securities may be as defined in the statute or as prescribed by the 
registrar.387The SA2010 defines the registrar as the registrar of financial 
                                                 
373
 Section 2(3) Banking Act. As will be seen later the Registrar is the Governor of the RBM. The 
registrar has the statutory authority to supervise banks. Section 14 Banking Act. 
374
  Part II, including limitation of shareholding [s 6], limitation of controlling more than one bank [s 6(4)] 
and approval of proposed bank directors [s 5(1)(c)] or their removal or suspension for sufficient 
cause [s 48(3)(a)(b)]. 
375
 Part III including maintenance of adequate capital – s 10(1). 
376
 Part V (Such as minimum liquidity reserve requirements). Overall objective is to protect the external 
value of the Kwacha, monetary equilibrium and other economic objectives – s 38(1) 
377
  Section 5(1)(j) the Banking Act does not provide for who determines this or how it is determined. It 
is subjected that this may potentially be abused. 
378
 S.14(1) Banking Act. 
379
 The powers of a liquidator are subject to the approval and control of the Registrar but any creditor 
may apply to the High Court for review with respect to the exercise of those powers – s 30(3) 
380
  Section 29(1) Banking Act. This is because banks are normally incorporated under other laws such 
as Companies Act, 1984 (hereafter Companies Act). 
381
 Section 26 Banking Act. 
382
  If a bank is placed under statutory management, the board of directors stands suspended – s 27(9)(a). 
383
  Section 27 Banking Act. 
384
 Section 30(8). It is submitted that this is discriminatory and may be challenged. 
385
 See s 32(5) Banking Act. This may not provide the much needed checks and balances and the 
regulator may become too powerful – see discussion on the regulator having an ‗agenda‘ of his own. 
386
 Section 2 Securities Act 2010 (hereafter Securities Act) : Securities includes shares, debentures 
etc and any warrant, right or option or interest in respect of such and any instrument including 
derivative instrument, contract, profit-sharing agreement, fractional interest, right to subscribe or 
any instrument commonly known as securities. 
387
 Section 2 Securities Act. 
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institutions appointed under the FSAM.388 The registrar is empowered to license 
and supervise and regulate activities of players in the securities market.389 He has 
to approve constitutions, charters and articles governing and pertaining to any 
stock exchange.390 By virtue of succeeding the CMDA, the SA2010 is the 
legislation under which the Malaŵi Stock Exchange (MSE) now operates.391 The 
SA2010 however makes provision for licensing of more than one stock exchange 
(apart from the MSE).392 The statute promotes the development of self-regulation 
by stock exchanges.393 
 
The SA210 provides that a stock exchange can only exist if it is licensed under the 
FSAM394 and it is an offence to do otherwise.395 When granting a licence the registrar 
shall consider if it is in the public interest having regard to the nature of the securities 
industry.396 Any registered stock exchange shall be managed by a board appointed in 
accordance with its articles of association.397 The registrar is empowered, in the 
interest of the investing public, to give directives with respect to trading on the stock 
exchange generally or with respect to trading in particular securities listed on the 
stock exchange.398 The registrar also has powers to approve rules of the stock 
exchange or any amendment thereto399 and even on his own motion to add, amend, 
delete or nullify rules in the interest of protecting the investors and fair administration 
of the exchange.400 All security brokers, dealers, investment advisors, portfolio 
managers, securities market intermediaries and securities representatives401 are 
                                                 
388
 Section 2 Securities Act. 
389
 Section 4(b) Securities Act. The regulation is by means of issuing directives s 4(d) and s 5. 
390
 Section 4(c). This may look intrusive but a necessary prudent regulation protecting investors. 
391
 Section 9(1) Securities Act. 
392
 Part III Securities Act especially s 7(1). 
393
 Section 4(k) Securities Act. The MSE was formed as a Self-Regulating Organisation (SRO). It is 
submitted that pursuant to this section, the MSE may not have lost that status. 
394
 Section 6(1) Securities Act. 
395
 Section 6(2) Securities Act. 
396
 Section 7(3)(a) Securities Act however it does not provide for who determines the ‗public interest‘ 
or how it is determined. It is once again subjected that this may open to be abuse and other 
political considerations. 
397
 Section 8(1) Securities Act. The use of ‗articles of association‘ would denote that the stock 
exchange must be registered as a company under the Companies Act first. 
398
 Section 11(1)(a) Securities Act. This may indeed be necessary to protect investors in case of a 
sudden crash of prices in one traded security or across the whole exchange. This includes closing 
of the stock exchange (only after consultation with the Minister) for the transaction of dealings in 
securities for such period as may be specified – s 12(1). 
399
 Section 13(3)(c) Securities Act. 
400
 Section 13(4) Securities Act. This power seems somewhat too wide as it does not provide how the 
Registrar is really to make this determination and this may be open to arbitrary application. 
401
 Who must be an employee of a broker, dealer, investment adviser, portfolio manager or an 
operator of a collective investment scheme – s 18(3). 
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required to obtain a licence before operating.402 The SA210 also requires that each 
security be registered by the registrar before it can be traded.403  
 
Unlike the CMDA, the SA2010 has a provision dealing with insider trading.404 The 
SA2010 also seems to attempt to regulate what can be described as legal pyramid 
schemes405 under the umbrella of collective investment schemes.406 Reading through 
the SA2010, it is clear that in Malaŵi trading on the stock exchange can only be done 
with registered securities and public stock.407 
 
3.2.5. Microfinance Act 2010 (MFA2010)408 
 
Under the MFA2010, no person can carry on business as a microfinance service 
provider unless registered or licensed under the FSAM,409 however, a licensee 
may apply to the registrar410 for approval to offer products and services under the 
Banking Act, Financial Cooperatives Act or the Insurance Act.411 A microfinance 
institution shall have as its primary function or business the provision of 
microfinance services412 and no more than five percent of the investible funds of a 
microfinance institution shall be invested in non-financial activities or assets 
unless permitted by the registrar.413  
 
The registrar may determine a threshold in terms of assets or services for a 
licensed non-deposit taking microfinance institution, as a group or individually, 
and upon attainment the registrar shall place such an institution under prudential 
                                                 
402
 Sections 17(1) & 18(1) Securities Act. Operating without a licence amounts to an offence – s 17(2).  
403
 Section 27(1) Securities Act 2010 excluding Treasury Bills or RBM Bills – s 27(4)(a). 
404
 Section 49 Securities Act. Although in s 5(g) of the Capital Markets Development Act the RBM had 
the task to prevent unfair trading practices and abuse of inside information. 
405
 As opposed to the get-rich schemes that have been described as illegal. The usage of the term 
pyramid is actually a misnomer since in collective schemes there is no pyramid structure with a few 
at the top benefitting from the entry into the scheme of the others. 
406
 Part IX Securities Act. 
407
 Schedule to the Securities Act. The Act however provides for secondary market transactions in 
securities – item 6 of the Schedule. 
408
  The preamble specifically says ‗an Act to provide for the regulation and supervision of microfinance 
services...‘ Most of the preambles in the other legislation making up the FSL just have ‗an Act to 
regulate ...‘ without including supervision see Banking Act 2009, Securities Act 2010. It would seem 
that the ‗new‘ acts all have regulation & supervision as the purpose – Credit Reference Act 2010, 
Insurance Act 2009, Financial Security Act 2010. 
409
  Section 5 Microfinance Act 2010 (hereafter Microfinance Act). 
410
  The act does not define the registrar but it is submitted that the registrar of other financial services 
applies mutatis mutandis. 
411
  Section 7 Microfinance Act. 
412
  As defined by the Act. 
413
  Section 14 Microfinance Act. 
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regulation414 as defined in the FSAM.415 Only institutions incorporated as a 
company416 may be licensed as a deposit-taking microfinance institution.417 The 
law also places limitations on institutions. Microfinance institutions are limited to 
owning shares in any company or enterprise of no more than ten percent of the 
sum of its capital and reserves418 and not to grant any credit facility to any debtor 
in excess of ten percent of its capital419 or not to have investment in immovable 
property that in aggregate exceed the sum of its capital and reserves.420 
 
The microfinance register shall be available for inspection by the public at the 
office of the registrar during workings hours.421 The registrar may by directives 
prescribe the composition of the board, frequency of board meetings, rules of 
appointment, responsibilities and additional qualifications of the directors of 
microfinance institutions.422 It is submitted that this is very intrusive and not 
necessary to achieve any prudential regulation.423 The MFA2010 also requires 
that the management of any microfinance institution comprise at least a chief 
executive officer and one senior management officer such as chief financial 
officer or head of operations.424 It seems strange that the act should designate the 
positions for institutions, most of which are private and who may opt for their own 
structure.425 It is therefore submitted that these positions are of guidance, that is. 
                                                 
414
  A prudential regulated financial institution includes a bank, licensed microfinance institution, 
securities exchange, securities deposit & broker, insurer & reinsurer credit and savings 
cooperative, a pension fund & an umbrella fund, a building society, credit reference bureau. 
Basically the definition covers all the relevant financial institutions plying their trade in the Malaŵian 
financial market. 
415
  Section 16(1) Microfinance Act. Where this determination is made, the institution is required to be 
incorporated as a company limited by shares under the Companies Act – s 16(2)(a) 
416
  Limited by shares as defined in the Companies Act. 
417
  Section 18 Microfinance Act. The registrar shall determine minimum capital or loan fund 
requirements whichever is applicable, for different categories of microfinance institutions- s 36(1). 
418
  Section 39(1)(c) Microfinance Act although this may be waived depending on the nature of 
business carried on by certain microfinance institutions s 39(2). 
419
  Or other such limited as the registrar may prescribe – s 39(1)(a). 
420
  Section 39(1)(b). 
421
  Section 22(1) Microfinance Act. There is only one problem with this, the RBM is a bank and a very 
secured one. Entry into it albeit being a bank is very restricted. The author‘s experience in the 
course of collecting information for this research is such that the RBM is not the best placed 
institution for a public inspection. The only consolation maybe that s 22(2) provides the publication 
through print and electronic media particulars of all registered, licensed and approved persons 
contained in the register. 
422
  Section 25(2) Microfinance Act.  
423
  The Act goes on to list the (strange) requirement of  prior approval for inter alia appointment of 
directors, opening of branch or establishment, restructuring. On the other hand, the other 
requirements such as going into liquidation, closing a branch or establishment are actually 
essential – s 26 Microfinance Act. 
424
  Section 27(1) Microfinance Act. 
425
  Depending on origin, ownership structure etc. 
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there must be at least a top officer and one heading finance and another heading 
operation, regardless of their titles. The requirement for prior approval by the 
registrar of the appointment of key management officers including the chief 
executive officer seems intrusive as well.426 It is submitted the registrar should 
provide guidelines on qualifications and attributes but not approval. 
 
Winding up of non-deposit taking microfinance institutions can only be instituted 
by the registrar by petition to the High Court.427 For deposit-taking institutions, the 
rules applying to prudentially-regulated microfinance institutions in the FSAM 
apply mutatis mutandis.428 The MFA2010 has a curious provision regarding 
regulations. It says the power to make regulations by the minister does not extend 
to making regulations about a matter in respect of which the registrar may issue 
directives.429 
 
3.2.6. Insurance Act 2009 (IA2009) 
 
The principal objective of the IA2009 is to make provision for the enhancement of 
the safety, soundness and prudent management of insurers and other persons 
involved in the insurance industry in Malaŵi with the aim of protecting the 
interests of insurance policyholders and ensuring the highest standard of conduct 
of business of insurance companies, brokers and agents.430 The IA2009 defers 
licensing and registration procedures to those of the FSAM.431  
 
The registrar of the insurance industry is the registrar of financial services 
appointed under the FSAM432 but licences the industry pursuant to the IA2009.433 
                                                 
426
  Section 27(3) Microfinance Act. It should be noted that in this subsection, the article used is ―the‖ 
not ―a‖ for chief executive officer which may denote the top person must be designated as ―chief 
executive officer‖. It is submitted though that this need not be the case and ―the‖ should be read as 
to mean ―a‖. The requirement in s,28 that persons meet minimum requirement before being 
appointed as director or in top management is what should have been the only guiding provision in 
the law for appointments . 
427
  Section 49 Microfinance Institutions. The section does not properly deal with cases where the need 
to wind up is by the shareholders (whether voluntary or involuntary liquidation). 
428
  Section 50 Microfinance Act. 
429
  Section 56(4) Microfinance Act. Curious because under the Malaŵian legal system, Ministers are 
statutorily empowered to make subsidiary regulation and this must be laid down before Parliament 
and has force of law and to make the registrar directive which is not open to an accountability 
process as that of a minister almost untouchable seems strange and out of the ordinary. 
430
  Section 3 Insurance Act 2009 (hereafter Insurance Act). The Act differentiates and defines insurers 
(and the different types of insurers ; general, life, local, reinsurer) from brokers and agents in s 2. 
431
  Section 5 Insurance Act. 
432
  Section 2 Insurance Act. 
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The Registrar may not license a person to carry out both life insurance business 
and general insurance business. It is submitted that person here should be 
narrowly construed. For example, in Malaŵi, NICO holdings is the parent 
company of NICO Life and NICO General insurance ‗companies‘ and if NICO 
Holdings were to be taken as the person then it would not be possible to have this 
situation. It is submitted that the corporate veil may need to be lifted here because 
the intention of the legislature may be circumvented by the creation of 
subsidiaries and giving them separate legal personality.434  
 
The registrar shall not grant a licence if it is would not be in the interest of the 
public and policyholders to do so435 and no insurer shall commence his business 
until the registrar has approved the commencement.436 Insurers (and reinsurers), 
brokers and agents are all required to be registered and licensed before their can 
operate their businesses.437 The law states categorically that payment of 
premiums by policyholders under their insurance to an agent or broker shall be 
deemed to be specific performance under the policy.438  
 
The law also restricts insurers in the investments that they can undertake. They 
cannot except with prior written approval of the registrar acquire more than ten 
percent of the outstanding voting share capital of a body corporate,439 the 
                                                                                                                                                        
433
  See s 8(1). 
434
  See Annex C. To make matters more interesting, NICO Holdings is the majority shareholder (de 
facto owner) of NBS Bank Ltd, another financial player. To the average person on the street, any 
attempt to convince them that there are actually 3 entities in NICO (NICO Holding, NICO Life and 
NICO General) would be met with surprise. This is compounded by s 26 which provides that if a life 
insurance company holds assets in a holding company, those shares shall be deemed to be held 
by the insurer as trustee for the benefit of the owners of the polices to which the liabilities relate. 
435
  Section 9(1) Insurance Act. Strange that policyholders are included in this provision since when the 
insurer is applying for license there are clearly no policyholders as far as he is concerned. 
Ss.34(10)(e) and 40(1)(f) provide that an agent or broker shall not conduct their business contrary 
to the interest of the public in Malaŵi. Once again the Act does not define how this interest of the 
public is to be ascertained. 
436
  Section 10 Insurance Act ; meeting of shareholders has been duly held and other legal formalities 
complied with, insurer has complied with the requirements of the registrar‘s directives regarding 
capital and reserves, insurer has entered into a reinsurance agreement with a reinsurer acceptable 
to the registrar, the insurer has on deposit(sic) an amount acceptable to the registrar, all other 
provisions of the Act and other relevant financial service laws have been complied with  
437
  See Part II and Part V Insurance Act. 
438
  Section 46(2) Insurance Act. In Malaŵi Specific Performance is part of contract law and can be 
enforced or ordered and it is submitted this provision was put to protect policyholders from agents 
and brokers who never remitted premiums to the insurers. Now the onus shifts to the insurers to 
ensure they have trustworthy brokers and agents. Clearly this is an application of law of agency 
that the principal should be bound by the conduct and dealings of his agent. 
439
  Or 10% of beneficial interest in an unincorporated entity. 
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aggregate value of all such shares440 not to exceed seventy-five percent of the 
actual liabilities of the insurer or acquire real property or any improvement thereon 
whose aggregate value is twenty-five percent for life insurers441 and ten percent 
for general insurers.442 Insurers are also required to have their assets invested in 
Malaŵi with sufficient regard to the consideration of liquidity, return and 
security.443The registrar may prescribe prudential limits for consumer and 
commercial lending by insurers in proportion to their assets.444 No person may 
acquire a controlling share445 in an insurer446 without the prior approval of the 
registrar.447 The winding up of an insurer or a broker448 shall be according to the 
Companies Act and the FSAM449 but the registrar shall not approve the winding-
up until all policyholders are paid or transferred to an alternative insurer.450 
 
The law also provides for the prior approval of the registrar for the appointment of 
executive officers451 and directors, change in articles of association, opening and 
closing branches, financial restructuring and liquidation.452 Every insurer should 
by law pay out claims no later than fourteen days after signing a claim of 
discharge certificate.453 The issue of ‗small print‘454 has also been addressed as 
                                                 
440
  And beneficial interests. 
441
  Of actuarial liabilities. 
442
  Of total assets – s 50 Insurance Act. 
443
 Section 52 Insurance Act. However this is subject to the articles of association of the insurer and 
any other reasonable constraints imposed on the insure by other rules in respect of the manner in 
which it may invest its assets. 
444
 Section 53 Insurance Act. 
445
  Controlling here means having a significant interest in any class of shares of the insurer. 
446
  Or an entity that holds shares of the insurer. 
447
  Section 55(1) Insurance Act. 
448
  Which are companies within the meaning of the Companies Act. 
449
  Section 57 Insurance Act. This seems to be a departure from the way winding up of other financial 
institutions is done i.e. banks, microfinance institutions. 
450
  Section 58 Insurance Act. Under a scheme for the transfer or the amalgamation of policyholders in 
accordance with the provisions of the Financial Services Act. 
451
 The law does not specify the positions cf with s 27(1) Microfinance Act. 
452
  Section 62 Insurance Act. The criticism against this power by the registrar with regarding to the 
other financial services law discussed equally applies here so does the need to protect 
policyholders. 
453
  Section 65(1) Insurance Act. It would seem 14 days may have been overly ambitious. The author 
has experience of a claim that took just over a month even after the enactment of the enactment of 
this law, and this was quite fast compared to the normal insurance processing rate experience that 
the authors has had before. The fact that the quoted this provision when making a demand for 
payment clearly played no small part in the fast processing! Therefore the law may have jostled the 
insurance companies into speedy action but the 14 days may be too short to be fair on them (they 
have to verify the claim and sometimes use contracted services for this). 
454
  Small print in insurance is usually used to denote the very small print that one cannot read when 
signing the policy but when the time arises to make a claim against the policy then voila the small 
print gets magnified and the claim is defeated. 
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no insurer shall issue a policy in a form whose provisions are not put in a clear 
type face in letters of uniform size no less than ten points.455 
 
3.2.7. The Credit Reference Bureau Act 2010 (CRBA) 
 
This is a new addition to the Malaŵi legal system as there was no regulatory or 
supervisory statutory framework for credit reference bureau operation. The CRBA 
defines the registrar as the registrar of financial institutions appointed under the 
FSAM456 and no person shall conduct credit reference bureau business unless 
licensed under the FSAM.457 The law also restricts licences to juristic persons 
which are limited liability companies.458 Public interest is not one of the criteria for 
licensing a credit reference bureau.459  
 
The CRBA is likely to change the facet of credit life of Malaŵians as a credit 
reference bureau has the statutory authority to collect information on the 
background and credit history of persons required by it.460 This may be welcomed 
as a positive development by those who want to access credit but also as an 
intrusion into the right of privacy of others.461  The bureaus are also likely to face 
problems as the law require them to collect not only postal but also physical 
addresses.462 Most Malaŵians do not have a physical address463 because most of 
                                                 
455
  Section 72 Insurance Act. Of course different type face produce different sizes so a ten point in 
‗Arial‘ may be different from one in ‗Times New Roman’ and in ‗Lucinda Console’ and ‘AngsanaUPC’ 
so maybe the issue of small print has not been completely done away with and the only 
qualification maybe be that it be in ‗a clear type face‘. 
456
  Section 2 Credit Reference Bureau Act 2010 (hereafter Credit Reference Bureau Act). 
457
  Section 4(1) Credit Reference Bureau Act. 
458
  Section 4(2) Credit Reference Bureau Act. In Malaŵi a company may be incorporated limited by 
shares or limited by guarantee ss 2, 5(1)(a)(b) Companies Act 1984. The provision does not state 
which. It may therefore be that even a company limited by guarantee (though not regarded as a 
company in the business and commercial sense – mostly an easy means of incorporation for most 
NGOs) may be licensed as credit reference bureau. The Courts may have to give directions on this 
though as the jurisprudence on this branch of law which is at the starting blocks develops. 
459
  See s 6 Credit reference Bureau Act 2010. This may not be required because of the other 
requirements i.e. security features to protect the database, background, reputation, integrity, 
competence and expertise etc. It is submitted that indeed such requirements should be the norm 
and that the vague notion of ‗public interest‘ should not be in the law, i.e. the requirements should 
be such that they do take care of the public interest. 
460
  Section 13(1) Credit Reference Bureau Act. 
461
  Section 21 of the Constitution provides for the Right to Privacy whilst s 19 provides the right to 
dignity and personal freedoms. It is submitted that litigation is most likely to follow should a 
person‘s  credit history be (accidentally or otherwise) become public knowledge since s 5 makes 
any law inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution invalid to the extent of that inconsistency. 
462
  Section 13(2) Credit Reference Bureau Act. 
463
  Whilst they may have a place where they physically reside, this place is usually not ascertainable in 
a definite manner. 
 
 
 
 
55 
the streets are not named and the ‗culture‘ of physical addresses is usually limited 
to registered entities.  
 
However a credit reference bureau does need prior written approval of the 
registrar for the appointment of directors and senior management, changes in 
articles of association, opening464 and closing of branches and liquidation.465 The 
CRBA also restricts the power of the minister to make regulations in matters in 
respect of which the registrar may issue directives.466 
 
3.2.8. Building Society Act 1964 (BSA) 
 
This legislation is now of limited application. Malaŵi had for a long time one building 
society, the New Building Society which later on turned into a bank, NBS Bank.467 No 
new player has really come into the building society market although there have been 
some endeavours by private entrepreneurs.468 Although NBS Bank still operates a 
‗mortgage‘ service, this is not under the umbrella of a building society but of a bank. 
The same facilities are offered by other banks.469   
 
The BSA contains however, an anomaly which is inconsistent with the FSL. Under 
the BSA, the minister is empowered to appoint a public officer to be registrar of 
building societies470 and in pursuance of this power the minister designated the 
secretary to the treasury471 as the registrar of building societies.472 It is submitted that 
this provision may have to be amended in light of the current FSL where there is one 
                                                 
464
  See the criticism regarding this discussed in the earlier sections having similar restrictions 
465
  Section 17 Credit Reference Bureau Act. 
466
  Section 33(2) Credit Reference Bureau Act. 
467
  Owned by NICO Holdings, arguably one of the biggest players in the Malaŵi financial system 
(owns NICO Life, NICO general and several subsidiaries in other countries).  
468
  For example the Kanengo Northgate Project in the outskirts of the Capital City near the Kamuzu 
International Airport. Most Malaŵians remember the New Building Society for its reposing and 
selling of houses than for its provision of loans. The fact that most of the loans became delinquent 
may be symptomic of is wrong economic fundamentals applied such as unaffordable interest rates, 
sometimes on compound basis. 
469
  In fact the vehicle of ‗mortgage‘ has fast been replaced with ‗charge‘ and it is more common to hear 
of a charge than a mortgage although the terms are interchangeably used. The Act does not define 
―charge‖ but employs the term in its provisions. 
470
  Section 5 Building Society Act 1964 (Chap 32:01). (hereafter Building Society Act). 
471
  Who sits on the Board of the RBM as an Ex-officio and is mostly the most powerful civil servant 
next to the Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet. 
472
 G.N. 111/1965 through subsidiary legislation as the Act did not designate a registrar but provided 
for registration and functions of a registrar. 
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registrar for all financial institutions.473 Since in Malaŵi the secretary to the treasury 
falls directly under the minister of finance, this makes the executive branch the de 
facto and de jure registrar of building societies. This is more so because the minister 
may, if he is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do to474 suspend the 
registration of new societies either indefinitely or for a stated period and during such 
period the registrar shall not register any new society and in any particular case 
direct the registrar that registration of a proposed society shall be refused.475 
 
Apart from the FSAM,476 the BSA is the only other FSL which contains a personally 
liable indemnity provision of the registrar and other persons acting under his authority 
for or in respect of any act or matter done in good faith in the exercise of the powers 
conferred by the Act.477 Under the BSA, the applicant for registration does not have 
to be a juristic person as any four or more persons478 who agree jointly to subscribe 
to permanent shares of the society to an amount of not less than £20,000 may form a 
                                                 
473
  This is an old law that was carried over from the colonial period and is in urgent need of revision. 
For example any person using the word ‗building society‘ without being registered by the registrar 
will incur a fine of £500 and £50 for each day for which such contravention continues s 3(3) 
Building Society Act. Using Pounds Sterling 47 years after Independence is gross! 
474
  By publication in the Gazette. The phrase ―if he is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do 
to ‖ and ―if he finds it reasonable in the public interest to do so‖ has been hotly debated in view of 
the recent change of a similar provision but of banning publication in s 46 of the Penal Code in 
Malaŵi. It is submitted that the latter whilst being contested as impugning upon constitutional 
freedoms is a better provision as it is subject to judicial review under the Wednesbury 
reasonableness test of administrative law. In Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury 
Corporation [1947] 2 All ER 680 CA Lord Greene MR said at 682-3: 
‗It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with 
the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 
"unreasonable" in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a 
general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion 
must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is 
bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to 
consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 
"unreasonably." Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream 
that it lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington LJ ... gave example of the red-haired teacher, 
dismissed because she had red hair. That is unreasonable in one sense. In another sense it is taking into 
consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in 
bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run into one another.‘   
475
 Section 8(4)(a)(b) Building Society Act. This seems to be much like absolute discretion and in such 
a case the ‗Wednesbury reasonableness‘ test would not avail itself to anyone prejudiced by the 
provision. 
476
 Section 98 Financial Services Act. But in the act the indemnity extends to other financial institutions 
and their officers in relation to provision of information to the registrar or any person under his 
authority in compliance with a financial service law unless it is proved that the provision of 
information was done in bad faith. 
477
 Section 6 Building Society Act. 
478
  Person includes the Government; s 2 Building Society Act. 
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society by subscribing their names and addresses to rules agreed by them for the 
government of such society and by obtaining registration under the Act.479  
 
Only the registrar may, with the approval of the minister, and in accordance with rules 
made by the Chief Justice, apply to the High Court for an order for the dissolution of 
the society.480 The registrar is however empowered to order dissolution of the society 
if satisfied that the society is unable to meet the claims of its depositors, and that it 
would be for their benefit that it should be dissolved. 481 The BSA does not require 
approval of the registrar for appointment of directors and leaves this to the members 
of the society.482 Because it also offers legal personality on societies, the BSA 
contains a lot of administrative and organisational provisions.483 
 
3.2.9. Financial Services Act 2010 (FSAM)484 
 
The FSAM is the umbrella legal framework for the supervision and regulation of 
financial institutions in Malaŵi.485 The Act defines a financial institution to include a 
bank, and institutions defined as such in the Securities Act, Insurance Act, 
Microfinance Act, Financial Cooperatives Act,486 Pension Act,487 Credit reference 
Bureau Act and the Building Society Act.488 This definition basically includes any 
                                                 
479
  Section 8(10 Building Society Act upon the issuance of a certificate by the registrar s 8(5). 
Section11 says upon such registration, the society shall be a body corporate by its registered name 
with perpetual succession and, subject to the Act, shall be capable of doing all such acts as a body 
corporate may by law perform. 
480
  Section 14 Building Society Act but dissolution may occur voluntarily under the supervision of the 
High Court – s 85(1)(b) or by the High Court – s 85(1)(c).It is submitted this leaves the door open 
for creditors to bring applications for dissolution under s 87(1)(c) and/or the Bankruptcy Act. 
481
  Section 91 Building Society Act. 
482
 Section 19 Building Society Act. 
483
  As would be found in the Companies Act or the Trustees Incorporation Act. 
484
 Section 2 defines the following as forming the Financial Service Law (a) Financial Services Act 2010 
(b) The Banking Act 2010 [sic] (c) Building Society Act (d) Insurance Act 2010 [sic] (e) The Pension 
Act 2010 [sic] (f) The Securities Act 2010 (g) Microfinance Act 2010  (h) The Financial Cooperatives 
Act 2010 [sic] (i) The Reserve Bank of Malaŵi Act (j) Bill Credit Reference Bureau Act, 2010 (j) a law 
that declares itself to be a financial service law for purposes of this definition (l) a law prescribed for 
the purposes of this definition and includes regulations, the registrar‘s directives and directions. The 
Pension Bill has just been passed and the Financial cooperatives Bill is yet to be passed. 
485
 Preamble to the Financial Services Act 2010 (hereafter Financial Services Act). Its principal object 
is ensure (a) safety and soundness, (b) highest standards of conduct of business, (c) fairness, 
efficiency and orderliness in the financial sector (d) stability of the financial system and (e) 
reduction and deterrence of financial crime in financial institutions – s 3. 
486
  Although it is stated as an Act in the Financial Services Act, the Financial Cooperatives Bill has just 
been enacted in 2011. 
487
  Although it is stated as an Act in the Financial Services Act, the Pensions Bill is yet to be enacted 
according to law. 
488
  Section 2, Financial Services Act, cf s 2, Reserve Bank of Malaŵi Act which is more general 
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institution489 dealing with financial or financial-like services in Malaŵi.490 The FSAM 
defines a controlling party of a financial institution as a director491 or a person who 
holds at least ten percent of shares, voting or other rights. 492  
 
Under the RBMA, the central bank, is the statutory regulator493 of the financial 
services sector and the governor of the RBM is the statutory registrar of the financial 
service sector.494 The law states the registrar495 shall be supported by adequate 
structures and employees with appropriate skills to enable him perform the duties of 
the registrar.496 The FSAM in a way gives directions to the silo nature of the 
regulatory framework.497 The registrar‘s power includes creating appropriate 
structures and establishing departments to supervise the operations of banking, 
insurance, pension benefit fund schemes, securities markets entities and other areas 
deemed necessary.498 Schematically this arrangement may be presented as:  
 
Fig 6. Note how but for the ―Others‖ departments, it closely resembles the existing RBM 
structure (fig 5). It is submitted that this resemblance is actually by design and the RBM has 
combined the others into the directorate dealing with microfinance & capital markets.
499  
                                                 
489
  Both juristic and natural persons. 
490
  Financial services means services relating to financial matters – s 2 Financial Services Act. 
491
 Or anyone with the power to appoint or give consent to the appointment of a director provided that 
the registrar or the minister shall not be construed as such. 
492
 Section 5(2)(a) Financial Services Act. The other rights are the one which if exercised would result 
in the person holding at least 10% shares or voting rights -s 5(2)(a)(vi). However the registrar may 
modify these requirements by directives either generally or in a class of cases – s 5(4) and the 
registrar may declare in writing that a specified person is or is not a controlling party of a 
prudentially regulated financial institution – s 5(5). 
493
 Section 3 The Reserve Bank of Malaŵi Act.. 
494
 Section 8(2) Financial Services Act. 
495
 In addition to his other functions, he has the function of advising the minister on matters related to 
financial institutions and financial services whether on his accord or on the minister‘s request – s 
9(2). The minister is not defined but it is submitted it is the minister responsible for finance. 
496
 Section 8(3) Financial Services Act. The RBM is also enjoined to support the registrar in carrying 
out his functions – s 9(1). 
497
 It may well be argued that since the Financial Services Act is a ‗baby‘ of the RBM, the law was 
tailored to fit the structure already in existence. 
498
 Section 8(3) Financial Services Act. 
499
 Clearly the structure takes cognizance of the fact that in Malaŵi there are no longer any building 
Society to regulate and supervise. 
Registrar 
Bank  
operations 
supervision 
Pension 
benefit fund 
scheme 
supervision 
Securities 
market 
entities 
supervision 
Supervision 
of 'others 
areas' 
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The registrar is empowered to delegate any of his supervisory functions500 and it is 
hereby submitted that in fact the directors in fig 5 have been thus delegated and for 
all intent and purposes exercise this power for the industry they regulate and 
supervise. 
 
The FSAM requires all financial institutions wishing to operate as a business to be 
licensed or registered under it501 or any other financial service law.502 The Act uses 
the terms license and register interchangeably and does not define them in a way 
that would distinguish them.503 It is submitted that registered would be the process of 
being enrolled in the register504 whilst licensing pertains to a legal right/authority505 to 
operate. It may however not be inconceivable for both the licence (document) and 
certificate of registration to be issued and this may happen when the licensing is 
bound for renewal whilst the registration may be a once off situation.506 The registrar 
is empowered to vary, suspend or revoke licences and registrations upon cause507 
but this power shall not be exercised before the financial institution has been given 
an opportunity to make representations thereof.508 
 
Under corporate governance, the appointment of directors and all executive officers 
and managers509 of financial institutions is subject to the approval of the registrar.510 
The registrar is empowered to disqualify an executive officer or manager of a 
                                                 
500
 Section 20(1) Financial Services Act ; but he may not delegate the ‗power of delegation‘. 
501
 Section 21(1)(a) Financial Services Act. 
502
 Section 21(4) Financial Services Act. 
503
 ―Licence‖ is defined as a licence under the Act or another financial service law and ―licensed‖ 
means licensed under the Act or under another financial service law whilst ―registered‖ means 
registered under the Act or under another financial service law – s 2 Financial Services Act. There 
is no definition for ―certificate‖. 
504
 After fulfilling any prior requirements. 
505
 At the risk of being superfluous, the ‗licence‘. 
506
 However s 23 says that on an application the registrar may (a) grant a licence (b) register an 
institution or (c) grant renewal of such licence or registration. The implication of this would be that 
there is not much difference between the two terms, and yet it must not be so. It is submitted this 
may have been a drafting problem because a license and a registration are not the same although 
the Act allows either one of them to operate – see s 21(10(a). 
507
 Section 27 Financial Services Act. 
508
 Section 27(4). This is in tandem with the audi alteram partem rule which literally means ‗hear the 
other party‘ – a cardinal rule in natural justice theory which has found its way into constitutional and 
administrative jurisprudence across the world and is a central part of Malaŵian administrative 
jurisprudence, 
509
 All executive officers and managers of prudentially regulated financial institutions shall be resident 
in Malaŵi after their appointment – s 30(2). 
510
 Sections 29(2) & 30(1) Financial Services Act. It is submitted that although this provision may 
override the flexibility in the Building Society Act.  
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prudentially regulated financial institution based on reason and prior notification to 
the institution.511  
 
Supervision and regulation of financial institutions is principally through directives 
issued by the registrar512 but a directive may not be issued unless a draft directive 
has been brought to the attention of the targeted institutions513 or the registrar 
consider on reasonable grounds that it is necessary to issue the directive urgently.514 
Any urgent directive issued without prior publication shall lapse after ninety days but 
may be reissued.515  
 
Apart from directives, the registrar may also give directions to financial institutions 
including a director, executive officer or manager requiring it to give information to the 
registrar or publish such information as directed relevant to the performance of the 
registrar‘s supervisory functions.516 But a direction that  affects rights of a party may 
only be issued after the institution has been given notice of the proposed action 
specifying the grounds for it and facts supporting thereof and allowing the 
institution517 to ask for a private hearing.518 The registrar may upon representations 
made to it [sic] modify or uphold any direction issued.519 However, the FSAM does 
                                                 
511
  Competence, business record or character, unsuitability to discharge the duties and responsibilities 
associated with the position – s 31(1). The notification allows the institution to make any 
representations prior to finalisation of the registrar‘s decision – s31(2). 
512
 Part V Financial Services Act. 
513
 Published in a way that the registrar considers will bring it to the attention of financial institutions to 
which it will apply. 
514
  Section 34(4) Financial Services Act. The employment of ‗reasonable‘ in this provision makes the 
decision amenable to judicial review under s 108(2) of the Constitution by the High Court on the 
‗Wednesbury reasonableness‘ test – on the application of this test on discharge of public authority 
see The State v The Chief Secretary to the President; Ex Parte Dr. Bakili Muluzi, Misc. Civil 
Application No 3 of 2011 (HC) Mzuzu Registry (unreported) where at 5 Chikopa J deals with the 
question ‗[i]s the decision unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense?‘ 
515
  Section 34(5) Financial Services Act. 
516
  Section 35 Financial Services Act and also auditor, actuary or other related party. The Act does not 
define what a directive and what a direction is and both have force of  law (s 2) but it is submitted a 
directive has more force than a direction although this may not always be the case. However s 39(1) 
gives credence to the argument that directions are more or less correctional in nature wile directives 
may be viewed, without sounding harsh, as decrees. However directions may also require an 
institutions not only to correct but do some positive act , albeit some seen as intrusive, such as 
removal an auditor or actuary [s 39(2)(e)], not to borrow a specified amount [s 39(2)(f)] not pay 
dividend [s 39(2)(g)] remove or suspend any person including a director [s 39(2)(k)]. 
517
  And person if need be. 
518
 Section 39(5) Financial Services Act. 
519
 Section 39(6) Financial Services Act. The section gives an underlying direction to comply with the 
direction of the registrar despite anything in the institution‘s memorandum or articles of association 
or regulations and despite any contract or arrangement to which it is a party – s 39(7). This prima 
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have a strange provision that any such issued direction shall not be ground for 
termination, repudiation or cancellation of a contract and a court may on application 
by a party make an order relating to the effect of the direction on the contract 
provided that such order may not require a person to take action that would 
contravene the direction.520 It is submitted this is untenable as it purports to uplift the 
direction of a registrar above the authority of the court and in the process oust the 
jurisdiction of the court which by law must make an order as it sees fit in the interest 
of justice, considering that the direction may indeed force a party to cancel, repudiate 
or terminate a contract.521  
 
The registrar may by instrument in writing appoint examiners and investigators.522 An 
examiner examines the affairs or any part of the institution to ensure compliance 
whilst an investigator is appointed where the registrar has reasonable grounds to 
believe that an offence has been committed, or there is no compliance or an 
institution is involved in financial crime.523 Such investigators or examiners shall have 
all the powers and protections of a commissioner under the Commissions of Inquiry 
Act,524 on top of the indemnity they have under the FSAM.525 
 
For self-regulatory organisations526 (SROs) like the Malaŵi Stock Exchange, its rules 
shall not be inconsistent with the FSL with respect to matters where the SRO has 
supervisory functions527 but any such rules and amendments thereto shall be of no 
effect unless approved by the registrar.528 An SRO shall also not amend its 
memorandum or articles of association or other constituent documents unless 
                                                                                                                                                        
facie will have far reaching consequences as the registrar may be accused of micromanagement of 
institutions and interference i.e. the tort of induced breach of contract. 
520
 Section 40 Financial Services Act. 
521
 In Malaŵi the doctrine of separation of powers is a Constitutional one and s 9 of the Constitution 
says the judiciary shall have the responsibility of interpreting, protecting and enforcing this 
Constitution and all laws and in accordance with this Constitution in an independent and impartial 
manner with regard only to legally relevant facts and the prescriptions of law. S.8 deals with the 
executive (under who the registrar falls) and the executive is responsible for the initiation of policies 
and legislation and for the implementation of all laws which embody the of the executive express 
wishes of the people of Malaŵi and which promote the principles of this Constitution. 
522
 Sections 41(1) & 42(1) Financial Service Act. 
523
 Sections 41(2) & 42(1)(a)(b)(c) Such examination and investigation involving visiting and entering 
into the premises of the financial institution – ss 41(3)(a) & 42(3)(a). 
524
 Section 43 Financial Services Act [referring to the Commissions of Inquiry Act (Chap 18:01, Laws 
of Malaŵi)]. 
525
 Section 98. 
526
  Hereafter in the text referred to as SRO(s). 
527
  This denotes statutory delegation of supervisory authority to SROs. 
528
 Section 46 Financial Services Act. 
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approved by the registrar, notwithstanding any provisions in the Companies Act.529 
The FSAM also provides an SRO, its employees and members indemnity for any 
loss sustained or damage caused to any person for bona fide acts done by them.530 
Under the FSAM, there is a forty-nine percent cap on shareholding by any one 
person or entity in a prudentially regulated institution.531 
 
Price fixing and price arrangement of financial service products may be prohibited if it 
is unfair to consumers, will tend to reduce competition, will result in exploitation of 
consumers or is otherwise undesirable.532 The registrar has to give prior approval for 
all compromises, arrangements and transfers of business of financial institutions 
without which the court shall make no order approving and such arrangements.533  
 
The registrar may place a prudentially regulated financial institution under statutory 
management on its own request or if it is not complying with the FSL, is financially 
unsound,534 involved in financial crime,535 refusing to submit itself to inspection by the 
registrar or has had its licence suspended or revoked.536 The purpose of this is to 
protect the interest of clients; stability, fairness and orderliness of the system as well 
as safety and soundness of financial institutions (avoid contagion).537 Where any 
such institution is placed under statutory management, the registrar or any other 
person appointed by him538 shall be the statutory manager.539The public shall 
                                                 
529
 Section 50 Financial Services Act. 
530
 Section 51 Financial Services Act. 
531
 Section 53 Financial Services Act. If on the commencement of the Act any institution does not meet 
this requirement it must within 6 months of operation of the law provide a credible plan to the 
registrar on how it will achieve this over a period not exceeding 5 years. The author , being a 
shareholder of a financial institution has had an experience where the majority holder vetoed any 
resolution and carried the day, including awarding themselves as a board exceedinging high perks 
when the company is not doing well. This provision will surely put such abuse to a stop. 
532
 Section 63 Financial Services Act. Most of the financial institutions have associations i.e. Bankers 
Association of Malaŵi, Insurance Association of Malaŵi, Dealers Association of Malaŵi and usually 
when prices are announced for their products (be it interest rates of other costs), all the players in 
the industry will usually announce at the same time and adjust by the same margin to the same 
amounts. It is submitted that there is actually collusion amongst the various players to the detriment 
of consumers and it is hoped this provision can be enforced for consumer good. 
533
  Part VIII Financial Services Act. It is submitted that the criticism earlier on laid about the attempt to 
limit the jurisdiction of the Court applies here and this provision may need to be seen through the 
Constitutional prism under which the judiciary is enacted. 
534
 including engaging itself in unsafe and unsound financial practices. 
535
 The Finance Bank of Malaŵi was placed under statutory management because it was suspected of 
having not complied with the financial service law with elements of financial crime. 
536
 Section 68(2)(a) Financial Services Act. 
537
 Section 68(2)(b) Financial Services Act. 
538
 Mr Neil Nyirongo, a former Deputy General Manager (and later Executive Director of Economic 
Services) at the Reserve Bank, was made Statutory Manager of the embattled Finance Bank of 
Malaŵi and served as Curator and Caretaker Chief Executive Officer. See ZoomInfo available at 
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immediately be informed by the registrar of the placing of any institution under 
statutory management.540 The statutory manager shall have the management of 
affairs of the institution to the exclusion of its directors and other managers.541  
 
The task of the statutory manager is to manage the affairs of the institution with the 
greatest economy possible compatible with efficiency and as soon as practicable 
report to the registrar what steps need to be taken at the institution to ‗correct‘ things 
up or if not practicable whether to transfer the business or to wind it up.542 It can 
therefore be inferred that although the law says the registrar may be the statutory 
manager, the law does not really envisage this situation as it would lead to an 
absurdity from a reporting perspective.543 The statutory manager is also not an 
independent manager in his own right as he has to comply with written directions 
from the registrar in relation to his functions.544 It is submitted that once a statutory 
manager has been appointed, the process will actually lead to clientele flight, lack of 
trust and most likely than not liquidation will be the end result.545  
 
A resolution to wind-up a prudentially regulated financial institution shall be of no 
effect unless approved by the registrar and an application to the court for an order to 
wind-up a prudentially regulated financial institution may only be made by the 
registrar or with his approval.546 It is argued that this provision as far as it purports to 
limit the court in hearing applications is open to legal challenge.547 If the institution is 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.zoominfo.com/search#search/profile/person?personId=396208502&targetid=profile  and 
Mireles I ‗Malawi‘ available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/africa/Malawi%20Final.pdf (both 
accessed 8 April 2011). 
539
 Section 68(3) Financial Services Act. On the drastic effects of statutory management to the 
customer base at Financial Bank, see Namwaza G ‗Scores ticked off at forex scarcity at FINBANK‘ 
The Daily Times 29 September 2005 available at 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MALAWIANA/message/4957 (accessed 8 April 2011). 
540
 Section 68(5) Financial Services Act. 
541
 Section 69(2)(a) Financial Services Act. 
542
 Section 69(4) Financial Services Act. 
543
 This demonstrates in the author‘s view that the drafters of the law did not fully apply their mind to 
the functions of a statutory manager.  
544
 Section 69(7) Financial Services Act. Although he can apply to the Court for directions, [s 69(8)] 
this may not in actual place happened because of his ‗subservient‘ nature and the question is 
whether he can challenge the registrar‘s directions in court considering that he may be removed at 
any time (for no reason) by the registrar –s 69(8). 
545
 This is exactly what happened in Finance Bank of Malaŵi. 
546
  Section 72 Financial Services Act. 
547
  Especially where it also states that the winding up shall be on such terms and conditions as the 
registrar may determine – s 72(3). This is language that is reserved for the courts after weighing all 
the circumstances of the case and deciding it in the interest of justice.  
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to be wound up, the registrar (again!) or any other person appointed or approved548 
by the registrar shall be the liquidator.549 
 
The registrar‘s decisions are however subject to review550 by the financial services 
appeal committee (FSAC).551 Membership of the FSAC comprises three persons 
appointed by the minister, one of whom shall be designated as chairperson, who 
have at least ten years experience as legal practitioners 552 or has the same number 
of years experience in the financial services industry who shall hold office for three 
years, subject to re-election.553 An application for review shall act as an automatic 
stay of any decision unless altered, set aside or replaced by the FSAC or where the 
parties have consented but with the consent of the FSAC.554 Parties to review 
proceedings are entitled to legal representation but the registrar shall be entitled as 
of right to be a party.555 The chairperson of the FSAC has the power to vary or 
revoke a direction.556 It is submitted that this power should not have been given to 
the chairperson but to the FSAC itself. Decisions of the FSAC557 shall be in writing 
and shall include the reasons, a statement of its findings and a reference to the 
evidence forming the basis of the finding.558  
 
It is yet to be seen how the FSAC operates in practice because of the very important 
position that the registrar holds, as governor of the central bank. Furthermore there is 
a presumption in favour of the registrar‘s decision. The law says unless the decision 
of the registrar is not supported by reasonable evidence, the evidence shall be 
affirmed.559  
                                                 
548
  Where you have a Court ordered liquidation, this power is supposed to be exercised by the Courts. 
549
  Section 73(6) Financial Services Act and the liquidator is first in ranking of claims –s 73(6)(a). 
550
  Section 82 employs the word appeals though so it would seem the Committee has both review and 
appellate jurisdiction. 
551
  Section 78(1)(a) Financial Services Act. Costs will follow the event – s 78(3). The Financial 
Services Appeal Committee is hereafter in the text referred to as FSAC. 
552
  In Malaŵi legal practitioner is a term that denotes that one has been admitted to the bar. Malaŵi 
does not have solicitors or barristers. The year requirement is surprising but not extraordinary as it 
is the same requirement before one can be appointed to judgeship of the High Court. It may well be 
that the intention is to create a quasi-judicial review body with equally well versed practitioners 
(either as lawyers or financial service experts) as members. 
553
 Section 79 Financial Services Act. 
554
 Section 83 Financial Services Act. See also s 88 on the powers of the Appeals Committee. 
555
 Section 84(2)(3) Financial Services Act. 
556
 Section 85(3) Financial Services Act. 
557
 By majority – s 88(2) Financial Services Act. 
558
 Section 91(1) Financial Services Act. It would appeal from this that the decision would be akin to a 
well reasoned judgement. 
559
 Section 91(5) Financial Services Act. 
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The law also limits to appeals from the FASC to the court to only questions of law560 
but in a somewhat contradictory provision states the court may hear and determine 
such appeals and make such order as it thinks fit to dispose of the appeal.561 
 
All financial institutions in Malaŵi are required to conduct a customer due diligence 
and report promptly to the Financial Intelligence Unit suspected money laundering 
activity related to any client or customer or any suspected illegal dealings inside or 
outside of Malaŵi.562 In its conclusion, the FSAM states that where a body corporate 
has committed an offence against the FSL, each director, employee or agent of the 
body shall (equally) be guilty of the offence and on conviction be liable to the same 
penalty unless established that he took reasonable precautions and exercised due 
diligence to avoid commission of the offence.563 It is submitted this is grossly unfair 
especially to mere employees, and it is open for legal challenge because of the 
manner in which it is framed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Although Malaŵi has been independent for 47 years, it still remains a LDC and 
poverty is a key challenge. The financial sector is not very well developed and 
reflects Malaŵi‘s size and economy. Banking dominates the financial sector and the 
stock exchange is illiquid. In summary the financial sector is still at a rudimentary 
stage with low public confidence.  
 
                                                 
560
 Section 92(1) Financial Services Act. 
561
 Section 92(3). In Emison Phiri v Illovo Sugar Civil Appeal No 36 of 2008 (HC) the question was 
whether the Court should hear an appeal based on facts when the s 65 of the Labour Relations Act 
(LRA) provides appeals only on points of law.  Madise J held citing the Constitution that the High 
Court has unlimited original jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceeding 
under any law. He said s  65 of the LRA tends to usurp the powers of the High Court to hear 
appeals from the IRC on matters of fact, in essence making the Industrial Relations Court (IRC) the 
final and binding arbiter.  By making IRC to be the final arbiter in respect of matters of fact is 
tantamount to creating a tribunal which has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court and the 
Supreme Court. He stated clearly that s 103 (3) of the Constitution does not allow this ‗[t]here shall 
be no courts established of superior or concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court of Appeal or 
High Court.‘ Lastly he said s 65 of the said Act is premised on the dangerous assumption that the 
IRC is immune from making errors of fact which is not so. It is therefore submitted that this 
provision may be challenged and considered impugning upon s 103(3) in the same manner. 
562
 Section 100(1) Financial Services Act. 
563
 Section 112 Financial Services Act. 
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This chapter has discussed the legal and institutional regulatory and supervisory 
framework currently operating in Malaŵi. The detailed discussion was important in 
order to bring to the fore the massive burden that the registrar of financial institutions 
has. An overview of the political economy under which the central bank operates was 
also done to illustrate the extent of the ‗executive clutches‘.  
 
The chapter made a brief exposé of the statues that comprises the FSL.564  The FSL 
in Malaŵi is under the umbrella of the FSAM but contains many statutes, most of 
which have been enacted in the last 2 years. The effect of these pieces of legislation 
on conduct of business is likely to be felt in later years but it signals an intention by 
Malaŵi to properly regulate its financial sector. The chapter analysed the regulatory 
structure of the RBM and noted how it closely resembles the structure in the FSAM 
and concluded that this is by design. It has been observed that the RBM employs a 
narrow silo regulatory and supervisory model. However in practice this work is done 
by directorates in the central bank.  
 
In a critical analysis of each of the financial service laws, the chapter also drew out 
some of the potential problems that the current legal, institutional and operational 
framework is likely to face, especially in view of constitutional supremacy and how 
the courts have tended to jealously guard any attempt to whittle down, oust or usurp 
their jurisdiction. 
 
Under the FSAM the registrar has expansive powers to issue directives and 
directions as well as penalties. Decisions of the registrar are amenable to appeal to 
the FSAC and further, on points of law, to the (High) Court. In analysing the FSL, the 
chapter concluded that the law seems to have simply built up an ‗inverted pyramid‘ 
as it has maintained the same institutional regulatory framework which has been 
there since independence. It has still retained the central bank as regulator of the 
financial service industry with its governor as the registrar.565 In view of the manner in 
which the governor and the board of the RBM are appointed, this raises issues of 
regulatory, operational, budgetary and institutional independence.  
 
  
                                                 
564
  Except for Acts that have newly been enacted which were not available. 
565
  Except for the anomaly in Building Society Act. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
4. Framework for a New Financial Regulatory System for Malaŵi. 
 
Nkowani said when looking at revisiting the regulatory framework for financial 
institutions in Malaŵi, there is need to consider developments that have taken place 
in the industry since the laws regulating the industry were first enacted.566 He admits 
that the infrastructure under the present framework is not well suited to developments 
of the years hence the need to align it to reflect these changes.567 
 
Malaŵi has enacted some new legislation in the financial sector568 but as was seen in 
the previous chapter, this has not resulted in the expected realignment. Furthermore 
as Mwenda stated, it is important to determine the size and structure of the industry, 
the role of the regulator as well as take consideration of economic, political, legal and 
historical consideration when designed a regulatory framework.569  
 
One thing that comes out clearly in chapter three is that the registrar of financial 
institutions is a very busy person. He has to regulate over a very wide range of 
services as well as undertake statutory management if need be.570 The current 
structure also presents itself susceptible to political machinations and this is not only 
from a historical perspective but has also been legally entrenched in the statutes.571 
 
Looking at the models of financial services regulation discussed in chapter two and 
the prevailing statutory and regulatory framework in Malaŵi discussed in chapter 
three, three models are proposed: 
 
 
 
                                                 
566
  Nkowani Z ‗Supervision of banks and financial institutions in Malawi‘ (2008) MLJ 49 at 54 (hereafter 
Nkowani Z (2008)). 
567
  Nkowani Z (2008) 54. 
568
  Mostly within the period 2009-2011. 
569
  Mwenda KK (2006) 6. 
570
  Including managing any liquidation processes. 
571
  Such as giving the President the exclusive power to appoint the governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi (RBM) who is the regulator as well as the RBM‘s Board. 
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4.1. Unified Financial Services Regulator (UFSR) 
The current regulatory framework as represented in fig 5 above illustrates that 
Malaŵi uses the single peak unified regulator. When compared to the models 
discussed in chapter two, it would seem that this closely resembles the Financial 
Service Authority (FSA) of the UK except that in the case of Malaŵi the regulator is 
part of another structure and is not ‗the structure‘.  The following diagram illustrates a 
proposed UFSR: 
 
Fig 7. Proposed structure of a Unified Financial Services regulator. 
 
To be independent, this structure needs to be rooted out of the Reserve Bank of 
Malaŵi (RBM) and become an independent self- standing agency. The legislative 
framework can then be amended to effect this ‗transplantation‘ and also provide for 
the appointment of a supervising board to oversee the operations. To achieve this, 
the following must be considered: 
 
4.1.1. Regulatory independence 
The law already gives the regulator wide autonomy in regulating the financial 
sector.572 The regulator also already has ample discretion to set and change 
regulations within the financial services law (FSL). It is therefore submitted that the 
current legislative framework does provide for regulatory independence under this 
model. 
 
                                                 
572
  The Financial Services Act 2010 and other financial services laws. 
Registrar 
Regulation and 
Supervision of 
Banks & other 
financial 
institutions 
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Supervision of the 
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Insurance Industry 
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4.1.2. Supervisory independence 
The current framework does provide for some supervisory independence573 subject 
to the executive‘s exclusive power of appointment. It is therefore submitted that 
under the UFSR, supervisory independence may in reality be achieved because of 
an independent governance structure. It is further proposed that supervisors574 be 
adequately compensated and these perks be such that they can attract and keep 
competent staff and avoid bribery and corruption.575 The current statutory framework 
giving the regulator sole authority to grant and withdraw licences is well suited to 
achieve supervisory independence.576  
 
4.1.3. Institutional independence 
To create institutional independence, the UFSR needs to be an agency that is at 
arm‘s length reach of the executive and legislative branches of government.577 This 
does not only entail having the UFSR as a separate agency, but senior personnel 
should enjoy security of tenure and clear rules must be laid down governing their 
appointment and especially dismissal.578  It is proposed that appointments to senior 
positions be made by an independent board and membership of this board be on a 
representative basis.579  
 
4.1.4. Budgetary independence 
The UFSR may require seed money from the state to start and run and this may be 
so for a few years before it is self-sustaining. It is therefore proposed that the 
proposed board of the agency approves the budgetary needs and the regulator be 
allowed to justify its budget before to Parliament.580 This would prevent unnecessary 
executive interference as opposed to the agency‘s budget being tabled as an 
appendage to the executive‘s. It is however proposed that the regulator would need 
                                                 
573
  Such as authority to investigate and visit institutions and revoke licences as well as indemnifying 
them – s 98 Financial Services Act. 
574
  Indeed all officers of the UFSR 
575
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW ‗Should Financial Sector Regulators be Independent?‘ IMF Economic 
Issues No 32, 2004 (hereafter Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004)).  
576
  Except for the curious case of the Building Society Act [Chap 32:01] which gives the Minister veto 
powers over licences - s 8(4)(a)(b) Building Society Act . 
577
  Mwenda KK (2006) 26. 
578
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004). 
579
  Representative of the stakeholders. This is not a new phenomenon in Malaŵi. The Technical, 
Entrepreneurial and Vocational Education and Training Authority (TEVETA) Act 1999 & the Malaŵi 
Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) Act 1994 provide for this representative 
appointment in the boards. MACRA is the Communications regulator whilst TEVETA regulates and 
oversees technical and vocational training in Malaŵi. 
580
  Other governance institutions such as the Anti Corruption Bureau enjoy this budgetary 
independence in Malaŵi. 
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to put in place strategies of ensuring the collection fees from the industry for its 
services to become self-sustaining. The current FSL already allows the registrar to 
do this and there would be no need for statutory changes to effect this. In fact the law 
presumes that the regulator may operate on fees charged for his services.581 
However, there is need to ensure that this does not lead to ―industry capture‖ and this 
can be achieved through a transparent governance structure.582 The example of the 
self-sustaining Malaŵi Communications Regulatory Authority583 may be emulated 
and can counter the fear of the regulator strapped for funds.584 The current 
framework allows senior staff to recruit subordinate staff.585 
 
Summary 
The current framework provides regulatory independence for a UFSR. To achieve 
true supervisory independence, the exclusive authority of the President to appoint the 
registrar586 would have to be removed and assigned to a transparent representative 
board. The current framework already provides the regulator with the authority to 
grant and withdraw licences.587 The UFSR staff will have to be adequately 
compensated in order to attract and keep competent staff and avoid bribery and 
corruption. To achieve institutional independence would require setting up the UFSR 
as a separate agency with an independent representative board as part of its 
governance structure. Senior staff must be appointed by this board and enjoy 
security of tenure. Finally the UFSR must be able to formulate and justify its budget 
through the regulator and where state funding is provided, the regulator should justify 
his budget to parliament.588  
 
                                                 
581
  But it must be noted that there is an implied reliance on the basic structure of the RBM supporting 
the registrar -  s 8(3) Financial Services Act. The RBM is also enjoined to support the registrar in 
carrying out his functions – s 9(1). 
582
  See Quintyn M & Taylor MW (2004) and  Mwenda KK (2006) 33. 
583
  The MACRA is perceived to be a very rich organisation in Malaŵi, and it does act so! 
584
  Quintyn M & Taylor MW(2004). It is submitted that the financial sector in Malaŵi is ‗bigger‘ and 
more profitable than the communications industry which has few players; the key lies in the proper 
fees structure. 
585
  Section 11 Reserve Bank of  Malaŵi (RBM) Act. 
586
  Although under the law the registrar is not directly appointed by the President ; by law the governor 
who is the registrar is appointed by the President – s 11 RBM Act. 
587
  Except the case of Building Society Act discussed above. 
588
  Based on the MACRA ‗success‘ story, the financial sector in Malaŵi is capable of supporting the 
budgetary requirements of the UFSR but suffice to say that although MACRA is seen as financially 
self-sustaining, questions arise as to whether it is an independent institution. 
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To achieve this will model require some statutory amendments as well as major 
institutional setup and changes. However, a more important requirement will be a 
change of culture589 and a lot of political will.590 
 
4.2. Triple Peak Financial Services Regulatory System (TPFSRS) 
As discussed in chapter three, although the regulatory framework is structurally 
represented in fig 5 above, the practical framework is that the three directors are the 
de facto regulators.591 The TPFSRS is premised on making these directorates 
independent regulatory agencies. When compared to the models discussed in 
chapter two, it would seem that this bears some resemblance to the twin peak model 
employed in Zambia.592 The following diagram illustrates a proposed TPFSRS: 
 
 
Fig 8. Proposed structure of a Triple Peak Financial Services Regulatory System. 
 
Like the UFSR, to be independent, the TPFSRS structure needs to be rooted out of 
the RBM and become independent agencies. This will require a great deal more 
legislative amendment as the current statutory structure concentrates all regulatory 
                                                 
589
  The change will mainly involve the fact that there has been the ‗transplantation‘ otherwise the 
structure would be much similar to what is currently in the RBM but this time operating as a 
separate agency. 
590
  Political will as used in this context is in the broader context and includes politicians, the executive, 
the legislature, business captains and the governance structure within the RBM. 
591
  Of the industry that falls under them. 
592
  But not exactly because the Bank of Zambia regulates the banks (and other financial institutions) 
whilst the Pensions and Insurance Regulator  is the other one – see Mwenda KK (2006) 46. 
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and supervisory powers in the regulator of financial services.593 However, most of the 
laws regulating the financial services594 do provide for a registrar of that industry and 
what may be required is an amendment that devolves the concentrated power to the 
three agencies.  
 
It is proposed further that to ensure that there is coordination in the financial services, 
taking into consideration the current status of the financial system,595 the three 
agencies must work together under a common board of directors, say a board of 
financial service regulation (BFSR). The duties of the BFSR would be to oversee 
operations of the three agencies from a macro level.596 The BFSR would be a 
transparent body composed of industry level representation597 and independent to 
prevent executive ‗hijack‘.598 Each of the agencies would have its own autonomous 
local board but the BFSR would be for policy formulation and regulating for the whole 
financial sector.  
 
4.2.1. Regulatory independence 
Like the UFSR, the law already gives the regulator wide autonomy in regulating the 
different industries.599 The regulator also already has ample discretion to set and 
change regulations within the regulated industry. It is therefore submitted that, 
subject to minor amendments,600 the current legislative framework does provide for 
regulatory independence under this model. 
 
4.2.2. Supervisory independence 
Similarly to the situation under UFSR above, the current framework does provide for 
some supervisory independence601 under the TPFSRS but it is proposed that the 
powers specifically provided for in the Financial Services Act 2010 (FSAM), such as 
examination and investigation need to be devolved and be included in the respective 
                                                 
593
  The RBM. 
594
  Insurance Act, Banking Act etc. 
595
  Still rudimentary and dominated by banking, 
596
  But leaving micro management to boards of each agency. 
597
  In this case of the financial service. 
598
  Or even ‗sectoral‘ hijack. 
599
  The Financial Services Act and other financial services laws. 
600
  Devolving the power of the registrar including the issuance of directives – see s 34 Financial 
Services Act. 
601
  Such as authority to investigate and visit institutions and revoke licences as well as indemnifying 
them – s 98 Financial Services Act. 
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legislation regulating each of the three silos.602 It is further proposed that each 
regulator be accountable to a representative board. The BFSR will therefore be 
tasked with oversight of the three agencies.603  The agencies must be able to attract 
and retain competent staff and offer enough perks to avoid bribery and corruption. 
Because the most likely scenario would involve a ‗transplantation‘ of  staff,604 the 
issue of uniformity of perks amongst the three agencies may have to be addressed, 
especially considering the unequal ‗wealth distribution‘ amongst the regulated 
industries.605  
 
The current statutory framework in each of the legislation giving the regulator sole 
authority to grant and withdraw licences is well suited to achieve supervisory 
independence for each agency but where the law grants this authority to the registrar 
of financial services, this power may have to be devolved.  
 
4.2.3. Institutional independence 
The TPFSRS clearly is premised on three separate agencies. Compared to the 
UFSR, it may be argued that the TPFSRS provides more independence because of 
its ‗multiplicity effect‘ and may provide better arms length reach from the executive 
and legislative branches of government. Like UFSR, senior personnel should enjoy 
security of tenure and clear rules must be laid down governing their employment.  It 
is similarly proposed that appointments to senior positions of each agency be made 
by an independent representative board of the regulated industry.  
 
4.2.4. Budgetary independence 
Because of the ‗fragmentation effect‘, the TPFSRS may require much more 
resources and on a longer basis before each agency can attain self-sustenance. 
There is also a danger that some of the agencies may never achieve this in the short 
to medium term.606 In this case the need for the ‗local‘ board to approve the 
                                                 
602
  See ss 41, 42 & 43 Financial Services Act. 
603
  This may be crucial to avoid contagion as well as share best practices in the financial system. 
604
  The most practical situation would be to ‗transplant‘ key staff from the RBM already involved in 
financial regulation and supervision. 
605
  The banking agency being obviously the ‗wealthier‘ and the pension regulator being of a new 
industry may require assistance. 
606
  It is submitted that only the agency regulating banking and other similar institutions may be truly 
self-sustainable. 
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budgetary needs and the regulator to justify its budget before Parliament is even 
more paramount.  
 
Because of the uneven ‗distribution of wealth‘ amongst the three agencies, although 
each regulator may be authorised to collect fees, the danger of ‗industry capture‘ may 
be greater with TPFSRS and may require vigilance on the part of the governance 
structure. This is where the BFSR may prove useful in providing oversight. 
 
Summary 
Subject to minor statutory amendments, the current framework provides regulatory 
independence for TPFSRS. Because under this model, the governor is no longer the 
registrar, the exclusive authority of the President to appoint the registrar 
automatically ceases to have its dreaded effect.  However three separate agencies 
will have to be instituted and may need longer support from the state before they can 
become self-sustaining.607 The law by and large provides for granting and withdrawal 
of licences within each industry but where this power is concentrated in the registrar 
of financial services, this will need to be devolved through legislative amendments. 
Each of the agencies will have to ensure adequate compensation in order to attract 
and retain competent staff and avoid bribery. Uniformity of perks may be a key 
solution to achieving morale and avoid ‗cross-over‘ of staff. To achieve institutional 
independence, each agency would need an independent representative board as 
part of its governance structure, subject to a BFSR. The ‗local‘ boards must appoint 
senior staff and the staff must enjoy security of tenure. Finally each of the agencies 
must be able to formulate and justify its budget and because it is envisaged that state 
funding may be required for a longer period, the regulator should justify its budget 
before parliament.  
 
To achieve this model will require a considerable more statutory changes as well as 
major institutional setup and changes. Since this would be a completely different 
setup to that which is currently in place, the need for culture change and political will 
is ever greater. 
 
 
                                                 
607
  And some may never be. 
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4.3. Imbedded Triple Peak Financial Services Regulatory System 
(ITPFSRS) 
This model proposes maintaining the regulation and supervision within the RBM but 
making the three de facto registrars (directors) to be the de jure registrars of the 
industry that falls under them. The registrars would still be within the RBM structure 
but would have legal authority in their own right and the governor and board of the 
RBM would provide oversight.  The ITPFSRS would look like: 
 
Fig 9. Proposed structure of an Imbedded Triple Peak Financial Services Regulatory System 
 
Because the ‗ITPFSRS‘ structure is imbedded within RBM, it would not require as 
many legislative amendments. However key would be the devolution of power from 
the governor (the current de jure registrar) to the three registrars (the current de facto 
registrars). The RBM would still maintain its function as overall regulator of the 
financial services but each registrar would be given autonomy to regulate the industry 
subject to oversight of the governor and board. This model requires the least 
changes as it will mainly involve a functional review. 
 
4.3.1. Regulatory independence 
Since the law already gives the regulator wide autonomy in regulating the different 
industries, regulatory independence is likely to be achieved. Subject to minor 
amendments, especially devolution of power from a single regulator, the current 
legislative framework does provide for regulatory independence under this model. 
 
(Board of Directors) 
(Governor) 
Registrar 
Banks & other 
financial 
institutions 
Registrar 
Micro-Finance & 
Securities Markets 
Registrar 
Pension & 
Insurance Industry 
 
 
 
 
76 
4.3.2. Supervisory independence 
Like the two models proposed above, the ITPFSRS does provide for some 
supervisory independence but it is proposed that the powers specifically provided for 
in the FSAM for the registrar of financial services be devolved and be included in the 
respective legislation regulating each of the three silos. To ensure that the registrars 
have operational autonomy, it is proposed that their appointment be made by an 
independent financial body comprising stakeholders in that industry, appointed on a 
transparent and representative basis with the involvement of the RBM. This is in 
taking cognisance of the fact that under the RBM structure, the registrars would be 
under the governor. It is further proposed that the registrars report directly to the 
governor and not through an intermediary.608 The need to attract and retain 
competent staff and offer enough perks to avoid bribery may be a challenge because 
of the fact that the structure is embedded within a pre-existing structure. The 
advantage though is that it would not involve ‗transplantation‘ of staff.609 It is 
proposed that each registrar be encouraged to build reserves that can assist in the 
autonomic operation of each regulator. The current statutory framework in each of 
the legislation giving the regulator sole authority to grant and withdraw licences is 
well suited to achieve supervisory independence for each agency but where the law 
grants this authority to the registrar of financial services, this power may have to be 
devolved.  
 
4.3.3. Institutional independence 
This may be done in two ways, having regulators outside the physical buildings of the 
RBM or creating space from within. The latter is easier as it involves fewer changes. 
The former is more involved but has been done before with MALSWITCH and the 
MSE.610 Compared to the above two models, the ITPFSRS may be regarded as the 
least independent but would still pass muster compared to the current regulatory 
setup. The issue of security of tenure of senior personnel may be tricky and may be 
safeguarded if the route chosen is have the regulators detached from the operating 
                                                 
608
  See fig 4 & 5 above, the Directors report through the General Manager, Supervision of Financial 
Institutions. 
609
  But more like relocation or transferring. 
610
  ‗Malawi Switch Centre (MALSWITCH) was established by the RBM to facilitate the implementation 
of a clear, secure and guaranteed electronic payment infrastructure in Malawi in line with the overall 
objectives of the National Payment System Modernization Programme.‘ – MALSWITCH available at  
http://www.malswitch.com/ (accessed 3 May 2011).  The Malawi Stock Exchange (MSE) was also 
created initially as an appendage of the RBM until it was able to stand on its own. Shareholders of 
MSE are RBM & Malaŵi Government – see ‗Malawi Stock Exchange – Company Profile : 
Shareholding‘ available at http://www.mse.co.mw/prof-share.html (accessed 3 May 2011). 
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offices of RBM whilst remaining within its wings.611  Because of its imbedded nature, 
institutional independence would be measured against the RBM‘s own independence 
unless the regulators were detached and separated.612 
 
4.3.4. Budgetary independence 
It is proposed that if the registrars are physically separated from the RBM (but still 
under its wings) then each registrar be allowed to justify his own budget to a 
representative board overseeing their operations.613 Even in a situation where the 
registrar is not separated, the registrar should be able to formulate his budget and 
defend it to the board of the RBM. In this model, the dangers of the ―regulator(s)‖ 
running out of funds614 or ‗industry capture‘ do not arise. Compared to the above two 
models, this model offers the least budgetary independence. 
 
Summary 
This model proposes preserving the current status quo but subject to a key 
fundamental change of delinking the registrar from the governorship. Because the 
RBM would be retained as the overall regulator, the existing legislative framework 
would not have to be changed to ensure regulatory independence for ITPFSRS 
except the devolution of power. Furthermore, as the governor is no longer the 
registrar, direct political influence may be somewhat be diminished.615 Setting up the 
ITPFSRS is the least costly as it is premised on the current setup with a few 
structural and institutional changes. The law would have to be changed to devolve 
the power to grant and withdraw licences within each industry to the respective 
registrars. The issue of perks is however likely to be a tricky one unless the registrars 
are separated from the RBM‘s offices. Although operating under the RBM, the 
registrars must be able to formulate and justify their budgets.616  
 
                                                 
611
  As in MALSWITCH or MSE. Even now, the MSE and MALSWITCH share the old RBM  Blantyre 
Branch. 
612
  MSE and MALSWITCH have been able to build up separate corporate images detached from the 
RBM even though they may for all purposes be ‗owned‘ by the RBM. 
613
  Both MALSWITCH & MSE have separate Boards. For the board of the Malaŵi Stock Exchange see 
‗Malawi Stock Exchange – Company Profile : Shareholding‘ http://www.mse.co.mw/prof-share.html  
(accessed 3 May 2011). 
614
  Unless the RBM itself has financial difficulties. 
615
  It may still be indirectly exercised. 
616
  Either to a (hopefully representative) board if  separated or to the RBM Board if fully imbedded. 
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To achieve this model will require minor legislative changes and minimal institutional 
changes.617 Since it is a setup that does not propose significant changes, there is no 
need for a culture change and the political will required will also be less. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed three proposed regulatory frameworks for the financial 
sector and has considered the statutory, institutional and structural changes that may 
need to be undertaken. The chapter used the ‗independence‘ yardstick to analyse the 
three proposals as well as the effects on the political and business establishment. In 
dealing with these proposals the chapter also looked at the possible advantages and 
disadvantages of each model. 
 
The UFSR provides the most independence whilst the ITPFSRS provides the least. 
The ITPFSRS and TPFSRS preserve the status quo in terms of business culture. In 
terms of costs, the TPFSRS is the most costly618 because it involves the creation of 
three separate agencies. Although the ITPFSRS strongly resembles the present 
regulatory setup, the major difference is that it devolves619 the registrar‘s power from 
one person. The most fundamental change may be the removal of the governor as 
registrar of financial services in all three models. 
 
In the next chapter the three proposed models are further analysed in the context of 
the situation in Malaŵi and recommendations are made depending on what may be 
achievable and practical by looking at the advantages and disadvantages of each 
model. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
617
  Unless the decision is to house the registrars separately, then this may require institutional capital 
to set up. 
618
  Financially and institutionally. 
619
  This in truth is the case for all the models. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The Malaŵi financial sector is regulated under the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) 
and its governor is the statutory regulator of the financial services sector. The thesis 
has shown that historically, the governor and the RBM have and continue to be under 
executive authority and they may not pass muster as independent institutions. The 
influence of the executive has also been shown to be more evident in multi-party 
Malaŵi. The thesis also examined financial regulatory models and made a 
comparative review of the United Kingdom and Zambia because of the historical ties 
that these two have with Malaŵi as well as the pioneering role of the UK‘s Financial 
Service Agency (FSA). The thesis also critically analysed the statutory framework of 
the financial service sector and isolated some of the issues that are likely to become 
topical issues or form the basis of legal challenges. In doing this, the thesis has also 
demonstrated the full role of the registrar of financial services (as required in the 
various financial services laws) and concluded that the registrar has a lot of 
responsibilities which the law requires of him. Considering that the registrar also has 
to govern the central bank, the thesis looked at models that would allow the governor 
to govern and the possibilities of freeing the RBM from being in the mix of things. The 
thesis then identified three possible frameworks under which the financial service 
sector in Malaŵi may be independently regulated.  In summary the three models offer 
the following: 
 
Independence: 
 
5.1. Unified Financial Services Regulator (UFSR) : 
5.1.1. Offers regulatory independence. 
5.1.2. Offers institutional independence. 
5.1.3. Offers budgetary independence. 
 
5.2. Triple Peak Financial Services Regulatory System (TPFSRS): 
5.2.1. Offers regulatory independence. 
5.2.2. Offers institutional independence. 
5.2.3. Offers budgetary independence but subject to weaker regulators failing to 
stand on their own and more susceptible to industry capture. 
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5.3. Imbedded Triple Peak Financial Services Regulatory System (ITPFSRS) : 
5.3.1. Offers regulatory independence. 
5.3.2. Its institutional independence is tied to RBM independence. 
5.3.3. Offers no real budgetary independence. 
 
Political will, culture change, legislative and institutional changes: 
 
5.4. UFSR : 
5.4.1. Requires a lot of political will 
5.4.2. Requires an adaptation of culture. 
5.4.3. Needs legislative changes in most of the financial services law and also 
to create a new institution. 
5.4.4. Requires major investment in institutional setup and structural changes 
5.4.5. Costly. 
 
5.5. TPFSRS: 
5.5.1. Requires a lot of political will 
5.5.2. Needs a complete culture change  
5.5.3. Needs legislative changes in most of the financial services law and also 
to create three separate institutions. 
5.5.4. Requires much more investment in setting up three institutions. 
5.5.5. Most costly. 
 
5.6. ITPFSRS: 
5.6.1. Requires less political will 
5.6.2. No need for a cultural change (business as usual) 
5.6.3. Minor regulator changes (fundamentally involving removing the governor 
as registrar but still retaining overall regulatory control within the RBM). 
5.6.4. Minor institutional and structural changes. 
5.6.5. Least costly. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
From an independence point of view, UFSR is the best model as it scores highly 
amongst all the independence ‗yardsticks‘ used in this survey. ITPFSRS is the least 
independent. TPFSRS offers independence except that it is more susceptible to 
‗industry capture‘ or becoming a burden on the state. 
 
From an economic, cultural and political viewpoint, ITPFSRS is the most attractive as 
it still preserves some form of political control with the executive, is the least costly 
and preserves the status quo in terms of business culture.620 The TPFSRS is the 
most costly and in terms of business culture requires fundamental changes as it 
creates three separate structures.621 The UFSR requires relinquishment of political 
control and cultural adaptation. It is less costly than TPFSRS but much more costly 
than ITPFSRS.622 
 
As was seen in chapter three, the registrar of financial services in Malaŵi has a lot of 
work. When one considers that the registrar is also the governor and looking at the 
functions of the RBM, it becomes clear that the RBM and the governor are 
overloaded with functions and for this reason both UFSR and TPFSRS would free 
the governor and the RBM from regulatory functions and allow the RBM to 
concentrate on its role as a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). Another benefit also 
accrues from the RBM delinking itself from regulation. During a financial crisis, one 
would want the RBM to come in not only as a LOLR but also with monetary policies 
together with fiscal policies of treasury that may contain the situation or at least 
prevent and arrest contagion. Should the RBM be involved in regulation and active 
running of troubled institutions, as was the case with Finance Bank of Malaŵi,623 the 
RBM may become involved in the financial ‗mess‘ itself and there might be no one to 
offer a rescue package.  
 
                                                 
620
  Economic in the ‗narrower and immediate expense‘ sense since in the broader sense having an 
independent institutional may be also economical. 
621
  UFSR is premised in uprooting the structure and ‗transplanting‘ it elsewhere whilst ITPFSRS is 
improving on the already existing structure where it is. 
622
  UFSR and TPFSRS are compared using economies of scales. 
623
  See Nkowani (2008) 50-2. 
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It would therefore seem that freeing the RBM from its regulatory functions may 
benefit the financial system from an independent viewpoint as well as allowing the 
RBM to independently oversee the operations of the financial services sector as it 
manages monetary policy. 
 
Looking at the three models, UFSR is the recommended model to ensure that Malaŵi 
has an independent financial regulatory system. However, in view of the legal, 
historical, political and economic context of Malaŵi, it is conceded that UFSR is 
unlikely to attract approval or the necessary political will to have it implemented.624 It 
may therefore be said that TPFSRS would offer a better alternative. However, 
considering the cost of its implementation, it is submitted that this may not be an 
attractive model at the moment. 
 
It is therefore recommended that Malaŵi implements the ITPFSRS because although 
it does not offer the requisite independence, it is the least costly, requires the least 
change in culture and most importantly requires the least political will.  
 
There is also an added benefit is starting with ITPFSRS. The fact that some control 
has been relinquished may provide an impetus for future regulatory changes and it is 
submitted that a transition can then be made to TPFSRS and eventually to the ‗ideal‘ 
UFSR. However, there is nothing to prevent a transition from ITPFSRS straight to 
UFSR should the political will be there because in terms of costs, UFSR is less costly 
than TPFSRS. 
 
Although TPFSRS looks the least difficult to implement, it also requires that the 
governance structure within the RBM accept and recognise the enormity of the task 
that the governor has and that devolving of power will not weaken but strengthen the 
institution and make it more efficient. It is therefore recommended that the model 
may easily be acceptable if it is perceived as having arisen from a ‗needs analysis‘ of 
the RBM.625  
 
                                                 
624
  Recent events in multiparty Malaŵi have shown, except for the period 2004-2009, the ruling 
political party has an absolute majority of legislators and the enacted laws are usually reflective of 
the political policies of the government in power. 
625
  The political will of the RBM governance structure and its controlling interests. 
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Recommendations for further research 
i. If any of the proposed models were to be adopted, what would be the actual 
legislative, institutional and structure requirements to make them or any part of 
them operational? Furthermore, can a hybrid model be moulded out of the 
proposed models?  
ii. Alternative capital markets; why has the Malaŵian business community not 
caught the ‗bug‘? 
iii. The relationship between securities trading and development and whether in 
Malaŵi the prevailing theories that stock markers lead to development hold.626 
iv. Regional stock markets and how Malaŵi can benefit from a regional stock 
market and cross-listing. 
v. Reform of the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi to make it more independent and 
accountable.627 
vi. Review of the New Building Society Act to bring it in line with the new financial 
service law in Malaŵi.628 
vii. Reviewing the breadth of the financial service law to ensure that its provisions 
are in line with the Constitution.629 
viii. Regulating shareholding of financial institutions.630 
 
In conclusion it is submitted that whilst the proposals and recommendations made in 
this thesis may not be implemented as presented, it is hoped the thesis has 
contributed to the knowledge and debate on the subject and may provide at least a 
framework on which needed regulatory changes may be implemented in the financial 
services sector in Malaŵi or from which further research and studies can be 
undertaken. 
 
 
                                                 
626
  Considering the low yield on the MSE and that most companies are having their stocks effectively 
‗devalued‘ by trading. 
627
  Using Parliament as accountability body especially regarding the appointment and tenure of the 
governor and the board. 
628
  Especially as it is the only law that designates the Minister as a the person to appoint a registrar of 
building societies and in so doing the registrar has appointed the Secretary to the Treasury, the top 
financial civil servant. 
629
 In Malaŵi an Act does not have to be ‗vetted‘ by the Constitution Court as is the case in South 
Africa and any offending law is challenged by application to the High Court – ss 5 & 108 
Constitution of Malaŵi 1994. 
630
  Section 53 The Financial Services Act provides a 49% cap but there is an ambiguity as to whether 
this only applies to shares held by individuals or entities. 
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APPENDICES 
 
(A)  MALAŴI STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY TRADING STATISTICS : THE YEAR 2009 
 
Company Opening Price Closing Price % Price Change  Share Vol. Trade  % 
Traded 
BHL   615   615   0.00    250,000   0.04 
FMB   1200   1000   -16.67    8,897,597   1.50 
ILLOVO  12500   11000   -12.00    3,579,160   0.60 
MPICO  430   260   -39.53    28,653,272   4.84 
NBM   6300   5900   -6.35    4,053,841   0.68 
NBS   1450   1400   -3.45    18,644,209   3.15 
NICO   950   900   -5.26    7,759,198   1.31 
NITL   2100   1550   -26.19    3,825,381   0.65 
PCL   20500   16300   -20.49    3,528,375   0.60 
PIM   625   625   0.00    429,910   0.07 
REAL   280   230   -17.86    3,241,093   0.55 
STANDARD   8500   9200   8.24    2,208,343   0.37 
SUNBIRD  890   890   0.00    546,684   0.09 
TNM   330   200   -39.39    506,316,082   85.47 
OML Plc  41500   25000   -39.76    487,144   0.08 
592,420,289  
 100.00 
The market recorded trading activity on all counters during the year 2009. TNM registered 
the biggest trading volume and value of 506,316,082 shares and a total turnover of 
MK1,005.48 million representing 85.47 % of the total volume of shares traded and a total 
turnover of 34.9% respectively. The top performing stock as measured by capital gains 
through a share price rise was Standard Bank by 8.34 % driven by positive half year results 
and anticipated earnings growth well above the 2008 results. 
 
Source : MSE Annual Market Performance Review; 01/01 – 12/31 2009 (Table 4) 
 
(B) MALAŴI ALL SHARE AND DOMESTIC SHARE INDEX – JAN - DEC. 2009 (Market Liquidity) 
 
 
 
Author’s note: Old Mutual Plc (OML Plc) is the difference between the Malaŵi All Share 
Index (MASI) and the Domestic Index (DSI). OLM Plc is registered in the London Stock 
Exchange and has cross listings in several other African exchanges like the JSE in South 
Africa and NSX in Namibia) 
 
Source: MSE Annual Market Performance Review; 01/01 – 12/31 2009 (Fig. 2) 
 
 
 
 
i 
(C) TYPE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES OPERATING IN MALAŴI 
 
Central bank –  Reserve Bank of Malaŵi 
 
Commercial banks:  National Bank of Malaŵi  
Standard Bank  
First Merchant Bank 
Ecobank  
INDEBank  
NEDBANK  
NBS Bank Ltd  
Malaŵi Savings Bank Ltd  
Opportunity International Bank of Malaŵi  
FDH Bank  
International Commercial Bank  
 
Finance houses and Merchant Banks: Leasing and Finance Company  
 
Savings and Credit institutions:  
 Malaŵi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO) 
 Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs)  
 
 Development finance institutions: INDEfund  
 
Insurance institutions  
General Insurers:  
NICO General Insurance Co Ltd  
Charter Insurance Company Ltd  
Citizen Insurance Co Ltd  
General Alliance Insurance Co Ltd  
Prime Insurance Co Ltd  
Reunion Insurance Co Ltd  
Real Insurance Co Mw Ltd  
United General Insurance Co  
 
Re-Insurers: Zimbabwe Reinsurance Co Ltd  (ZIMRE) 
 
Life-Insurers:  
Vanguard Life Assurance Co Ltd  
Old Mutual Life Assurance Co Mw Ltd  
NICO Life Assurance Co Ltd  
 
 Stock Exchange  : Malaŵi Stock Exchange  
 
Stock brokers  
African Alliance Securities Ltd 
CDH Stockbrokers Ltd 
FDH Stockbrokers Malaŵi Limited 
Trust Securities Limited 
 
Discount houses  
Continental Discount House Ltd  
First Discount House Ltd  
 
 Pension Fund Administrators 
Old Mutual Life Assurance Co Mw Ltd  
NICO Life Assurance Co Ltd  
Baobab pensions 
Associated Pension Trust 
Source:http://www.sadcbankers.org/SADC/SADC.nsf/LADV/E4E3EF0D1F5967B84225767400
44D454/$File/Malawi-.pdf (accessed on 25 March 2011). 
 
 
 
 
j 
(D) LIST OF BOARD MEMBERS OF THE RBM 
Dr. Perks Ligoya Governor 
Mrs. Mary Nkosi Deputy Governor 
Mr Ted Sitimawina Secretary for Economic Planning & 
Development (now Development Planning & 
Cooperation) (ex-Officio) 
Dr Patrick Kambewa Economics Professor (University of Malaŵi) 
Mr. Joseph Mwanamveka Secretary to the Treasury (ex-Officio) 
Mr. Gautoni Kainja Legal Practitioner (private sector) 
Mrs. Betty Mahuka Accountant (private sector) 
Source: http://www.rbm.mw/aboutrbm.aspx accessed (30 March 2011). 
Note: designation of representative of private sector comes from the author‘s knowledge of these 
Board members. Mr. Kainja is Senior Partner in Kainja & Dzonzi whilst Mrs. Mahuka is Director of 
Finance at the ESCOM Ltd. 
 
 
(E) LIST OF GOVERNORS WHO HAVE SERVED AT THE RBM 
Dr. Perks Ligoya 2009-Present 
Mr. V. Mbewe 2005-2009 
Dr. E.E. Ngalande 2000-2005 
Dr. M.A.P. Chikaonda 1995-2000 
F.Z. Pelekamoyo 1992-1995 
Hans Joachim Lesshafft 1988-1992 
S.C. Hara 1986-1988 
L.C. Chaziya 1984-1986 
J.Z.U. Tembo 1971-1984 
D.E. Thomson 1968-1971 
A.G. Perrin 1968 
Source: http://www.rbm.mw/aboutrbm.aspx (accessed 30 March 2011). 
Note: All the Governors are/were Malaŵian except Perrin, Thomson and Lesshafft. 
 
 
 
 
